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Résumé 
En 1994, le président Russe, Boris Eltsine, avançait que l'élargissement de 
l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN) pourrait faire sombrer l'Europe 
« dans une Paix Froide' ». Aujourd'hui encore, ces paroles résonnent lorsque l'on 
constate l'entêtement avec lequel la Russie s'oppose à l'élargissement de l'OTAN, qui 
s'étend de plus en plus près de son territoire. En effet, la croissance de l'OTAN vers ce 
qui a constitué pendant au moins cinquante ans la sphère d'influence de l'URSS, et même 
une partie de celle-ci, ne semble toujours pas terminée. Aux yeux de la Russie, cette 
expansion semble souvent guidée par les ambitions des États-Unis. 
Cette courte mise en contexte soulève la question suivante: comment expliquer la 
réaction de la Russie face à l'élargissement de l'OTAN sous l'int1uence de l'hégémonie 
américaine? En analysant cette relation plutôt complexe, nous argumenterons que cet 
élargissement de l'OTAN, sous influence américaine, est le principal facteur qui a motivé 
la Russie à promouvoir la multipolarité du système international et à multiplier ces 
alliances dans le but de contrer l'hégémonie américaine, et par le fait même contrer 
l'expansion de l'OTAN qui se rapporte de plus en plus du territoire russe. Tant que la 
question de l'élargissement de l'OTAN n'est pas réglée, il y a de fortes chances que la 
prédiction de Boris Eltsine se concrétise. 
Le cadre théorique utilisé dans cette thèse nous permettra d'avoir une meilleure 
idée quant aux perspectives d'avenir du comportement russe. Dans un premier temps, 
nous utiliserons le néoréalisme de Waltz, selon qui la Russie peut être considérée comme 
une grande puissance au sein du système international, étant donné ses intérêts et les 
enjeux sécuritaires auxquels elle fait face. Dans un second temps, nous utiliserons une 
approche constructiviste qui explique les actions de la Russie sur la base de l'identité 
nationale véhiculée au sein de la société par l'élite dirigeante, et non pas en termes de 
puissance relative. L'application de ces deux théories des relations internationales nous 
permettra ainsi d'identifier des tendances plus générales en ce qui concerne différents 
aspects de la relation entre la Russie et les États-Unis par rapport à l'OTAN. 
1 Traduit de l'anglais. Cité de Sciolino Elaine, "Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying ta Split Continent Again", 
New York Times, December 6"', 1994, p,A.l 0 
INTRODUCTION 
ln 1994, Boris Yeltsin declared that the expansion of NATO could potentially 
bring "a cold peace" to Europe. 1 Today, his comment is reflected towards NATO 
expansion and the consequent insecurities of Russia. Although another Cold War is 
unlikely in the near future, the potential for one, however small, cannot be discounted. 
The expansion of NATO into what was formerly part of the USSR's sphere of influence 
has Jed Russia to seek potential alliances of its own in order to check American power, 
potential allies that include Iran, China, and India. This paper applies two theoretical 
approaches to an examination of Russia's response to NATO's expansion. First, using 
Waltz's neorealism, Russia's security and economic interests are considered in light of its 
raie as a great power in the international system. The second approach, constructivism, 
explains Russia's actions on the basis of an identity enacted, rather than in terms of 
relative power. A rich understanding of Russia's response to the expansion of NATO 
requires insights derivative of each of these approaches. 
From a Russian perspective, NATO's expansIOn IS undoubtedly guided by 
American ambitions. NATO enlargement benefits the U.S because any additions to the 
NATO alliance are likely be pro American in their outlook. Furthermore, keeping an 
active NATO preserves America's political and military leverage in Europe and 
underscores its hegemonic position in transatlantic relations. This Russian view of 
America's influence on, and leveraging of, NATO -- present since the inception of the 
organization after WWII -- calcified after the end of the Cold War ushered in a wave of 
1 Quoted in Scia lino Elaine, "Yeltsin Says NATO Is Trying ta Split Continent Again", New York Times, 
December 6th , 1994, pA 10 
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eastern expansion and American actions in Russia's sphere of influence. Indeed, contrary 
to expectations ofa 'peace dividend' after the faH ofthe USSR in 1991, the US Congress 
began looking into the question of modernizing its own armed forces to defend against 
terrorism and rogue states. The American system for Global Protection Against Limited 
Strikes (GPALS),2 could be used not only to defend the US, but also to defend members 
of NATO; perhaps more significantly, it could also be used to defend members located 
near the Russian border. To Russia, this signifies that the Americans are attempting to 
expand their empire and to close in graduaHy on Russian borders. Of course, Washington 
has rejected aIJegations that NATO's expansion is invasive. 
The process of NATa expansion in central and Eastern Europe started with the 
integration of three new members in 1999: Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, aH 
former members of the Warsaw Pact. These countries decided to join NATa, and were 
accepted, despite Russian objections. For Russia, their decision to join NATO was taken 
as a betrayal as the Red army had 1iberated them from Nazi rule. For Russia, the 
enlargement of NATO's sphere of influence was interpreted as establishing a new buffer 
zone excluding Russia from Europe. 3 During the same year, NATO bombardments of 
Serbia seemed to confirm the Russian hypothesis that the US was, indeed, 100king to 
extend its power on the international scene into regions which would have been 
previously within the U.S.S.R's sphere. American reaction to the war in Kosovo made 
clear the attitude adopted by the sole remaining super power: Americans would not only 
Z ln his 1991 State of the Union Address, George H. W. Bush shifted the focus of SOI from defense of 
North America against large scale strikes to a system focusing on theater missile defense called Global 
Protection Against Limited Air Strikes (GPALS). See Hildreth A. Steven, Ballistic Missile Defense: 
Historical Overview, CRS Report for Congress, January 5'11 2007, available at 
http://www.cdi.org/POFs/RS22120.pdf 
J Fitchett Joseph, "3 Members Added From Former Soviet Bloc: NATO Moves Eastward", NelV York Times, 
March 13111 1999. Available al: http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/13/news/l3iht-nato.2.t_7.html 
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Ignore the United Nations, but also NATO, act under their own auspices and grant 
themselves the right to intervene. From Russia's standpoint, this was an usurpation of the 
right to intervene, which might eventually be seen as justifying any actions taken by 
NATO anywhere in the world: including Russia. For Russia, military action in support of 
humanitarian objectives was simply a caver for aggressive action against a sovereign 
territory; as Boris Yeltsin declared: "This is in fact NATO's attempt to enter the Twenty-
First Century as global policeman.,,4 
Apparently Russian concerns were justified, to sorne extent, as, in 2004, NATO 
witnessed its largest expansion in history, integrating seven new members: Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. This latest expansion 
profoundly troubled Russia. In particular, the integration of the Baltic States constituted, 
according to the Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov, proof of NATO 
encroachment into Russia's sphere of influence: "The alliance is gaining greater ability to 
control and monitor Russian territory. We cannot turn a blind eye as NATO's air and 
military bases get much closer to cities and defence complexes in European Russia."s 
For Russia is greatly concerned that NATO is still expanding, but stiJl more 
troublesome is that the US seems to be expanding its own power through NATO. One 
might note that the new system of aerial defense, BALTNET, created by the American 
company Lockheed Martin for the Baltic States,6 is another way in which Americans are 
4 Quoted in Barton Gellman, "U.S., Allies Launch Air Attack on Yugoslav Military Targets," Washington 
Post, March 25, 1999, p.A 1. 
5 lvanov Sergei, "As NATO Grows, So Do Russia's Worries", New York Times, April 7th 2004, p A.19 
6General information about BALNET and Lockheed Martin avaiJable at: 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/news/press_releases/2003/LatviaAcceptsLockheedMartinRadarFor.html 
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usmg NATO to their own advantages. 7 NATO also has a hand in the regional 
organization, Organization for Democracy and Economie Development, GUAM, wherein 
ail members are challenging Russian policies towards the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) and wherein ail members have been supportive of NATO enlargement and 
have received significant support from the United States.8 With NATO now considering 
expanding to include Ukraine and Georgia - states that have good relations with the 
US- the alliance is moving closer to the Russian border. Furthermore, US installations 
of ABM systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, and of military installations on 
Bulgarian and Romanian soil, is clearly intended to reinforce their strategie importance 
within NATO and to reinforce pro American stance and influence.9 
Problematic 
Within this context, one is led to seek answers to the following question: how will 
Russia react to the expansion of NATO being carried out under the influence of greater 
American hegemony? By analyzing this rather complex relation, 1 argue that the 
expansion of NATO, under American auspices, is the principal factor leading Russia to 
promote a multipolar international system, and that its new alliances aim to counter 
American hegemony and the expansion of NATO. As long as the question of NATO 
expansion is not settled, there is every reason to fear that the new Cold War predicted by 
Boris Yeltsin might come to pass. 
7 Ibid.The majority of Lockheed M3Itin's business is with the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. 
Federal government agencies. Lockheed Martin is the largest provider of IT services, systems integration, 
and training ta the U.S. Government. 
8 I(uzio Taras, "Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Emergence of GUUAM", European Security,VoI9, 
No2, Frank Cass, London:(Summer 2000), p81- [ 14 
9 Hervouet Gerard, Fortmann & Legault,Ed, Les Conflits dans le Monde: Rapport annuel sur les conflits 
internationaux, Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2007, p72-73 
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Methodology 
The goal of this project is twofold: to analyze Russia's responses to NATO 
expansion - operating under American auspices - and to argue the explanatory value of 
neorealist and constructivist theories in analyzing those responses. This research will 
concentrate mainly on Russia during the presidency of Vladimir Putin because it reflects 
the remarks made in 1994 by then president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who affirmed that 
the widening of NATO could sink Europe into another Cold War lO This period is also 
interesting because, upon his arrivai in power, Vladimir Putin identified this "file" as one 
of his top priorities. 11 Moreover, since Putin recently finished two presidential terms, this 
period in Russian history is important in analyzing the policy of Russia vis-a-vis the 
expansion of NATO, orchestrated by American hegemony, and thus to determine if his 
policies were the same throughout his presidency. 
To collect the data on which this analysis rests, l will research newspaper articles, 
on-line sources, various written reports published by the Russian government, as weil as 
several specialized articles and reviews. Among the local Russian newspapers of interest, 
Moskovskiye Novosti, Vremya MN, Moscow Times, Novaya Gazeta and the St Petersburg 
Times will be of particular interest. The research will also make use of newspapers 
available on the Internet, such as CNews online, Eurasian Home, Pravda, and Ria 
Novosti. The majority of these sources are available in English. With regards to 
information available only in Russian, basic language training has enabled me to read 
sorne of these articles, however, as stated above, most information can already be found 
10 Seiolino, op.eit, p A.l 0 
Il Kassianova Alla, "Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolution of the State ldentity in the Foreign Polie)' 
and Security Diseourse", Europe Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No.6 (Sep. 2001), p821-839 
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in French or English. These above sources are essential to the research as they provide for 
a better understanding of Russian public opinion in spite of obstacles arising due to issues 
associated with constraints on the freedom of the press in Russia (where most sources of 
information are under government control). In addition to the articles mentioned above, 
reports and other official documents will be utilized. The principal documents of foreign 
politics that will be drawn on are the National Security Concept and Foreign Policy 
Concept, which were government official texts under the Putin regime. These texts are 
significant in so far as they enable us to recognize the various principles guiding 
decisions made by the Russian government on certain questions, as well as the various 
objectives that it contains. These texts also reflect the ideas and opinions stated by 
Russian leaders. Through this reading, it will be possible to identify what Russia regards 
as threatening its national security, and to better understand the consequences resulting 
from this. 
This paper contends that to comprehend fully the behavior of Russia towards the 
United States and NATO, it is essential to analyze not only the official texts, but also 
speeches made by its leaders, and to consider the reaction of its population. This research 
will consider severa] speeches, in particular those by president Putin. The use of these 
speeches will enable us to highlight the dynamics animating the Russian population and, 
thus, to better understand its reactions and motivations with regard to Russian expansion. 
Not all of the sources used in our work are primary sources. Secondary sources 
will be especially important, in particular the newspaper articles and various books by 
authors specializing in the subject area. These sources will be useful in interpreting and 
analyzing these problems and questions, and will also provide us with more extensive 
7 
knowledge on how experts differ in their considerations of the effects on Russia of the 
widening of NATO, under American influence. 
Lastiy, the specialized articles to which we will have recourse can be divided into 
two categories: articles relating to the theories of international relations - like those 
written by Kenneth Waltz, Gideon Rose, Randy Schweller or Stephen Walt - and articles 
concentrating more specifically on Russian policies regarding NATO and the United 
States - most notably those written by Al Stam, Sherman Garnett and Thomas Ambrosio 
to name a few. 
For the drafting of this thesis, l chose to concentrate on a documentary analysis. 
However, the goal is not to make a complete inventory, nor a simple compilation, of the 
results of this research within the framework of "mega analysis". It is therefore preferable 
to pay careful attention to the detailed theoretical aspects of our questions and to 
concentrate on research already published. In the end, the objective consists of 
identifying the merits and the weaknesses of the various methods and approaches 
employed by various authors, while trying to show objectivity in our evaluation of the 
credibility of the sources used. 
To carry out our analysis, one will also have recourse to surveys from existing 
sources. Since this study relates to Russia, the expenses connected to transport and 
lodging would have been exorbitant and obtaining samples representative of the Russian 
population would have been excessively difficult. Moreover, it would have been 
necessary also to have recourse to a professional translator, which would have fUl'ther 
complicated the task. Thus, the use of existent surveys and sources proves much more 
advantageous. 
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While analyzing Russia's responses to NATO, this paper will demonstrate how 
relevant the approaches of neorealism and constructivism remain in the domain of 
international relations in spite of new appraaches or theories that seem to disregard or 
"embellish" old ones. The value of using a neorealist method rests on transformations of 
the international system since the end of the Cold War. In that context, while Russia 
strave to survive economic and political upheaval, the United States was enjoying its 
position as the sole super power. According to neorealist theory, systemic changes in the 
international system will drive Russia to seek to restore the previous, more favorable 
balance by countering American moves. Does this prediction praye true? And why is this 
still relevant? In this thesis, 1 will try to show that neorealism remains relevant in 
explaining Russian actions with respect to the expansion of NATO under the auspice of 
American hegemony. 
Another theory differently illuminating Russia's predicament, constructivism, 
assumes that the "self' or identity of astate is a dependent variable determined by 
historical, cultural, social and political context, in contrast to neo-realism, which assumes 
that states act in terms of an unvarying and universal self-interest-understood as 
enhancing their power and security in the context of an anarchie politicaJ setting. 12 State 
action flows from a particular "state actor" identity shared by a governmental elite and an 
understanding of international context, both of which are viewed as socially constructed 
and historically contingent. 13 These two theories thus offer two distinct views of the 
current situation. 
12 Hopf Ted, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations TheOl-Y", International Security, 
Vol. 23, No.l, Summer 1998, p 173 
13 Ibid 
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To demonstrate the usefulness for these two approaches, this paper will briefly 
explain why these theories (via neoclassical realism or other theories) are best suited to 
this analysis. This section will demonstrate that neorealism and constructivism, in spite of 
their weaknesses, seems to be the most productive theoretical approaches to analyze 
Russian reactions. 
Organization ofcontents 
The purpose of the first chapter will be to identify the appropriate theory of 
international relations to describe the behavior of Russia towards NATO expansion. This 
section will provide a short, comparative overview of the principal theoretical approaches 
of international relations which couId be used also to interpret Russian reaction, notably 
neorealism, neoclassical realism, and constructivism. Oiven that the theory of 
neoclassical realism offer different strengths and weaknesses than those of neorealist and 
constructivist theorists, this chapter will demonstrate the comparative value of realist and 
constructivist approaches in order to elucidate Russia's actions. 
The second chapter will examine the development of relations between Russia 
and the United States since the end of the Cold War, as they are mediated through and 
exacerbated by NATO. Analyzing the influence of the United States on the decisions of 
NATO, with particular attention paid to Russia, proves to be crucial to understand 
Russia's behavior. This historical background informs an empirical analysis and 
concentrates on the major events marking this still fraught relationship: the inauguration 
of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the creation of Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) and of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC), the 08, and the crisis of 
la 
Kosovo. This section provides a short historical overVlew of key moments in the 
evolution of these relations before the Putin presidency and the decisions made by Putin 
once In power. 
The impact of the terrorist attacks on US soil on September Il, 200 1 (9/11) and 
Russian policy will also be analyzed. These attacks, according to several experts, marked 
a positive turning point in Russo-American relations. However, in light of the research 
carried out, the United States is still not ready to consolidate this "new" relation and is 
unable to find with Russia a "compromise" on the expansion of NATO regardless of 
Russia's commitment to the US to capture these terrorists. Indeed, NATO seems to share 
the American perspective, wanting to exclude Moscow from important decisions, again 
leaving it on the outside looking in. Finally, this paper addresses the situation in South 
Ossetia, Georgia, arguing that the crisis between Georgia and Russia is in part a reflection 
of tensions arising out of the expansion of NATO and the will power of the United States 
to include Georgia in NATO. 
Chapter 3 will look at the importance of military and economic capabilities both 
to Russia and NATO members. This chapter will also analyze Russia's sem"ch for new 
allies, the turn to Iran, India and China, as weIl as the way in which these partnerships 
have affected Russia's relationship with NATO. Russia's objectives are to increase its 
influence within the international community, to put forward its interests with regards to 
its security, and to possibly achieve greater influence over NATO's decisions and 
expansion. Thus, the Russian behavior becomes clearer and more logical: it seeks to 
Il 
renew its influence and power as an international actor, but is especially interested in 
trying to stop the process of NATO expansion. 
In Chapter 4, we will be looking at our palr of theoretical approaches, 
introduced in Chapter 1, and evaluate their value in our interpretation of Russia's 
behavior regarding NATO's expansion. One will look at the pros and cons of each theory 
and observe whether or not both theories might lead us to arrive at the same conclusions. 
The final chapter will focus on the potential assumptions, questions and 
interrogations for the future. The paper will look briefly at plausible resolutions to the 
disagreements between Russia and the United States vis-à-vis NATO. Is it possible for 
Russia to achieve a high degree of security vis-à-vis the expansion of NATO into its 
former satellites? There exists, according to experts, various solutions, but are these 
realizable? Should Russia be granted a veto over NATO's composition insofar as its 
safety is concerned? There are several alternatives, and by working through these 
complex questions will offer ta the readers various tracks for future exploration. 
Chapter 1
 
Which theory is best suited for this case study?
 
Among the explanatory theories available in International Relations, certain 
realist approaches are more effective than liberal approaches in analyzing specifie 
situations. This paper contends that both a realist and eonstruetivist approaeh are both 
weIl suited to the analysis of Russian behavior towards NATü expansion. Both 
approaehes used in this paper should not be interpreted as an attempt to eircumvent or 
neglect the contributions of other theories and approaches. However, in order for this 
analysis to remain within reasonable parameters, this paper will only foc us on the two 
above mentioned approaches. 
Before analyzing the neorealist approaeh, it IS important to make note of two 
categories of realism. The most popular is Waltz's neorealism, but neorealism has come 
under much scrutiny, especially for its lack of a domestic variable. The neoclassical 
realism of Gideon Rose has emerged with a solution to this lack, bringing together both 
internaI and external variables for examining and explaining state behaviors (a mishmash 
of neorealism and constructivism). However, it will be shown that despi te the advantages 
offered by this "fuller" theory, neorealism is still better suited to explain Russia's 
reactions to NATü expansion and the constructi vist approach cannot be easily factored 
into our equations and needs be dealt with separately. 
1.1 Neoclassical Realism 
Neoclassical realists postulate that states not only seek to ensure their safety, but also to 
influence and control their external environment. The goal of this theory is to combine 
the neorealism of Waltz - which sees the structure of the international system 
13 
as most important - with internaI variables, with the overall aim of providing a better 
explanation of the behavior of states which, at certain points in their history, move away 
from the apparent logic of maintaining a balance of power. As noted by Gideon Rose, 
neoclassical realists were inspired by neorealists, since they give particular attention to 
the positioning of states within the international system just as with their material 
capacities and their relative power. 14 On the other hand, the neoclassical realist model 
differs from the neorealist model in that the impact of the distribution of power on 
foreign politics is, according to Rose, indirect and complex because the pressures of the 
international system must be examined and interpreted through intervening variables 
ls
operating at the domestic level. Thus, the capacity of the head of state to mobilize the 
human and material resources of the nation behind political initiatives dealing with 
security will heavily influence its response to any redistribution of power within the 
international system; that is to say, by limiting or by increasing its capacity to react. 16 For 
neoclassical realists, structural factors remain essential to the process of developing a 
foreign policy, but they also recognize that the way in which astate responds to changes 
in the system is ultimately affected by the decision of its leadership to mobilize resources 
and by its perception of the situation. 
Neoclassical realists believe that it is impossible to formulate a theory of foreign 
policy. They cite Waltz, the founder of neorealism, that the "theory of international 
politics is not a theory of foreign policy".17 For example, two classical realists argue 
14 Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", World Polilies Vo1.51. # l, John 
Hopkins University Press, Oct. 1998, pl46 
15 Ibid, P157 
16 Ibid, p161 
17 Waltz, Kenneth, « [nternational Politics is Not Foreign Policy », Seeurity Siudies, vol. 6, no. 3 (Autumn 
1996), p. 54-57 
14 
against Fareed Zakaria and his assertion that a theory of foreign politics must "explain 
why different states or the same state at different historical moments, have different 
intentions, goals, and preferences toward the outside world.,,18 By saying that it is a 
"theOl'y of peculiar circumstances, and of constant exceptions, and as such it represents a 
considerable challenge to scholars, since it confounds their ability to construct a model 
applicable to ail cases of individual states."J9 Neorealists refuse to even ponder the idea 
of including internai variables because they believe it is impossible for internai variables 
to outweigh externat variables: "the system will have the last word in determining the 
foreign policy of astate, regardless of any other intervening factors.,,2ü Haglund and 
Onea, two neorealists, see neoclassic realists as often using exceptional case studies, but 
ones which always end up having a logical, traditional, realistic explanation. The two 
authors take as an example the book by Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, and say that 
even if internai factors prevented the United States from expanding at the end of the 19th 
Century, expansion occlmed anyway at the beginning of 20111 Century. Consequently, 
they complete their reasoning by saying that systemic pressures take priority over the 
internai pressures. They conclude that "an anomaly [such as the United States from 1865­
1898] presupposes an eventual return to normality; otherwise it cannot be considered an 
anomaly. ,,21 
Waltz said it best when he wrote: "One cannot infer the condition of international 
politics from the internaI composition of states, nor can one arrive at an understanding of 
international politics by summing the foreign policies and the external behavior of 
18 Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, Princeton University Press, luly 261h 1999, p. 14 
19 Haglund, David G. & Tudor Onea, « Sympathy for the Devil: Myth ofNeoclassical realism in Canadian 
Foreign Policy », Canadian Foreign Policy, vol. 14, no. 2. Fall 2008, p. 58 
20 Ibid., p. 59 
21 Ibid. 
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states.,,22. Waltz is not the only one sharing his beliefs. Several authors would argue that 
neoc1assical realism lacks theoretical the predictive power because it avoids a "mono­
causal focus" on either domestic or systemic variables. 23 These are only some of the 
reasons why this paper will concentrate on the neorealist approach instead of its newer 
version neoclassical realism. Furthermore, aithough this paper will later argue the 
advantages of analyzing internai variables, it does not mean that the neorealist and 
constructivist approach should be combined into one theory. This task is far more 
complex than what the neoclassical neorealists would argue. 
1.2 Neorealism 
The foremost scholar on neorealism,Waitz, sees the international system as one in 
which states pursue their interests in the midst of anarchy, and explains state behavior as 
a matter of responding to conditions generated by the system; the structure of that system 
is said to be detennined by the arrangement of military power. Coercion, or the threat of 
it, is the driving force behind state calculation and security is the prime concern. States 
determine their security status by evaluating their capabilities against those of other 
states- unfavorable balances are therefore a cause for concern. Because the system is 
deemed anarchie within this framework, there is nothing to prevent states that possess 
superior capabilities from exploiting those with less. This situation encourages less 
powerful states to redress imbalances so as to lessen hegemonic influence, thereby 
22 Waltz Kenneth, Theorv of International Poli tics, New York McGraw Hi Il, 1979, p64. 
23 Wa1t Stephen M, "The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition," in Political Science: The State of 
the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002), 211; and Jeffrey 
Legro & Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security, President & Fellow of 
Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, Vo1.24, No.2 (Fall 1999), p5-55 
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preventing a dominant power from reconfiguring the international system to its own 
benefit. The ideal arrangement, according to Waltz, is a bipolar system-such as existed 
during the Cold War-so that the efforts of both poles to gain an advantage may be 
checked by the other with little disruption. By extension, successful campaigns to expand 
a sphere of influence are unlikely to upset the system as a whole. Thus, for Waltz, a 
bipolar system provides a great degree of stability. In a unipolar system, lesser states will 
try to counteract the power of a dominant or rising state, but, if successful, such efforts 
may very weil have significant collateral effects and thereby disrupt the entire system. 
Looking at the international structure, unipolarity appears to be the least durable 
of international configurations, for as Waltz nicely describes the situation: "As nature 
abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power.,,24 As the 
international system is currently shaped by the hegemonic power of the United States, it 
is only natural that other states in the international system, seeking to promote or increase 
their own interests, should form alliances with the aim of restraining the reach of the 
current hegemon. For example, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the faU of the Iron 
Curtain left NATO-initially established to discourage an attack by the Soviet Union on 
the non-communist nations of Western Europe-with no obvious mission. According to 
Russia, the United States, having become an unopposed hegemon, crafted NATO and 
other international institutions to promote its own interests at the expense of other states, 
including Russia. 
24 Waltz Kenneth N, "Structural Realism after the CoId War", international Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 
(Summer 2000)no.84., p. 28. 
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Neorealists argue that although the initial purpose for NATO is no longer 
relevant, the organization does, nonethe1ess, serve the particular ends of the United 
States. According to Waltz, NATO provides a means of maintaining and broadening 
America's influence over the military and the foreign policies of European states. 25 This 
may be illustrated in the words of the US Senior Deputy to the Undersecretary of State 
for European affairs, John Kornblum, who states the CUITent purpose of NATO, thus: 
"The alliance provides a vehicle for the application of American power and vision to the 
security order in Europe.,,26 For a neorealist, the main role of institutions is to serve the 
interests of the rnost powerful states; currently, the United States. The neorealist scholar 
Robert Art has argued that the presence of American troops in Europe is also beneficial 
to other states, for without them "European states will lapse into a security 
competition."n From this perspective, it is to the benefit of ail that the US maintains its 
powerful position in the international system. Given such views, it is understandable that 
Russia should feel tlu'eatened and seek to balance the power of this unipolar actor. This is 
comprehensible as NATO's eastward expansion, along with its revised mission, may 
commit it to undertaking military action in unstable "peripheral areas" that could extend 
the alliance's area of operation in the direction of what was previously deemed Russian 
territory. One Russian analyst terms NATO's "eastward and south-eastward expansion" 
into Eurasia's "heartland" as a new round of US expansion.28 Thus, NATO cannot be 
used to counter or to check American power since America is the greatest contributor to 
25 WaJtz, op.cit, p. 20 
26 Kornblum John, "NATO's second Half Century-Tasks for an Alliance", NATO on Track for the 2J Sl 
Century, Conference Report (The Hague:Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1994), p 14 
27 Art Robert J, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO", Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. III, No.l, Spring 1996, pl-39 
28 Max imenko Vlademir, "The 8attle Against Eurasia: One Century of the US Geo-Strategy in the Old 
World", Transcaspian Projecl, 24 April 200 l, P1. Mr. Maximenko is identified as senior scientific officer 
of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 
18 
European security and the greatest force in the organization; meanwhile, the US can use 
NATO as it wishes, or act alone, or form convenient "coalitions of the willing" if it 
pleases. In this context, safeguarding Russia's sphere of influence and its material 
concerns requires that it counter American efforts to dominate the system. In Russian 
eyes, the country risks its very survival if it fails to curb American hegemony before it 
becomes too firmly established. As a consequence of the imbalance of power, neorealists 
expect relatively weaker states-such as Russia-to pool their resources together in order 
ta check the growth of an aspiring hegemon. 
Facing American encroachment and its influence over NATO, Russia needs to act 
swiftly, and yet carefuily, as it recognizes that it is unable to compete directly with the 
United States.29 Although the United States enjoys an advantage in conventional military 
power, Russia is not without significant military resources. Waltz suggests that in the 
presence of nuclear weapons, any challenge to a leading state, and any attempt to reverse 
a state's decline, has ta rely on economic development.3o Russia must therefore reinforce 
its security by actively seeking strategie economic and military alliances with states 
dissatisfied by a unipolar world while simultaneously building its economic influence. 
According to neorealism, the state quest for security forces them to be wary of 
international cooperation and international organizations. For this reason, making 
alliances is very difficult. For neorealists, a state will cooperate only if its security is not 
put at risk. The main problem with cooperation or alliances is that states can never be 
certain about their own security, thus security-seeking states, according to neorealists, 
29 [n this paper, the terms NATO and USA wi Il be used interchangeably.
 
30 Waltz Kenneth, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", International Security, Vol. 18, No.2,
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will ultimately be concerned about the relative gams made by other states through 
military and or economic cooperation. States will ally with each other if they face a 
common threat or, if by cooperating, the state will gain significant concessions from the 
other party and realize a relative gain. These are two reasons, according to neorealists, 
why rational states would seek alliances. 
1.3 Construetivism 
An alternative approach to understanding international relations, constructivism 
offers the promise of reintroducing a focus on particular and unique social, cultural and 
political practices of states to I.R. theory. Analysis of the interplay and development of 
historically contingent identities, worldviews and intersubjective understandings of 
international relations is central to the constructivist approach to world politicS.31 In 
contrast to neorealism, which assumes that states act in terrns of an unvarying and 
universal self-interest-understood as enhancing their power and security in the context 
of an anarchie political setting-constructivism assumes that the "self' or identity of a 
state is a dependent variable determined by historical, cultural, social and political 
context,32 State action t10ws from a partieu/ar "state actor" identity shared by a policy 
elite and an understanding of international context, both of which are viewed as socially 
constructed and historically contingent,33 A state's behavior is viewed as an intention to 
enact its identity as astate actor, conditioned by shared constitutive norms. For example, 
if a state identifies itself as a "Great Power," it will act to realize that identity in terms of 
31 Hopf, op.cit, p 173 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
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prevailing norms regarding Great Power behavior (regardless of its current material 
status). 
In creating a "Great Power" identity, the state affirms existing constitutive norms 
regarding the behavior appropriate to major powers. It will be shown that this is exactly 
how Russia currently views itself on the international scene. Constructivist international 
relations theory focuses not only on policy elites' construction of the identity of the state 
as actor and the construction of national interests, but also the construction of national 
34identities by elites and the self-construction of individual political identities.
According to this view, Russian behavior is constrained as much by its 
understanding of its own identity as by the views of others. Whether Russia succeeds in 
enacting the preferred identity of its elite depends on the opportunities and constraints 
afforded by the international situation and the actions of other states, as weIl as the 
congruence, or non-congruence, of elite identity with popular identities. Generally, elites 
are severely constrained in reproducing Great Power identities when, as is currently the 
case in Russia, mass identities instrumental to their ends-the military and other forms of 
service to state interests-are devalued. A constructivist interpretation by professor 
William D. Jackson notes, for example, the cornmon failure of young Russians to report 
for dut y when conscripted into military service, massive illegal capital flight, tax evasion, 
and the depressing morale of Russian troops in Chechnya, may be understood as social 
practices challenging and constraining efforts by the Russian political elite to enact an 
ambitious international identity.35 
34 Jackson 0 William, "Imagining Russia in Western International Relations Theory", Miami University, 
avai lable at: http://ww\\.L1llits.muohio.cclu/ha\..ie:hursrcentel"lpublications/clocLlll1cnts/Jackson.pdf.p 10 
35 Ibid, p12 
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As mentioned above, if one employs discourse analysis to consider how identities 
are constructed, state officiaIs are indispensable when it cornes to examining state 
securi ty discourse: "The representations created by state officiais make clear both to 
those officiais themselves and to others who and what 'we' are, who and what 'our 
enemies' are, in what ways 'we' are threatened by 'them', and how 'we' might best deal 
with those 'threats,.,,36 Stephen Walt, while comparing different IR theories, also found 
that "[i]nstead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it simply seeks to survive 
such is the claim of neorealists, constructivists regard the interests and identities of states 
as a highly malleable product of specifie historical processes... [and] pay close attention 
to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and 
interests, and establishes accepted norms of behavior.,,37 As we shaU see, the construction 
of a homogenous identity is a fairly complex undertaking. By breaking Russian political 
society into groups based on their ideological orientations, we note that a different 
"vision" of Russia is espoused by each of the fi ve schools of thought, each of which also 
share a different vision of world order: Westernizers, National Democrats, Statists, 
National Communists, and Expansionists. 38 It would be futile to describe aU of these 
different visions, but ail share somewhat differing views of Russia's identity, and 
although aU oppose NATO expansion, each has a different opinion on how best to 
respond. In order to understand Russia's identity at any particular time, it is impoliant to 
consider to which schools of thought the future elite will belong. The "allegiance" of an 
36 Weldes Jutta, "Constructing National Interests", European Journal ofinternational Relations, Vol. 2 (3)
 
1996, p. 283.
 
37 Walt M. Stephen, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories", Foreign Poficy, Springl998, p.
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actor to a particular ideology will shape that actor's vlew of the role of Russia and 
ultimately his or her views concerning NATO. For the purpose of this research, the 
crucial role of the president as the most public embodiment of the Russian identity is 
emphasized. 
Of the five main schools of thought, Westernizers, National Democrals, Stalisls, 
National Communists, and Expansionists, the two that require our attention are the 
National Democrats and the Statists.39 The National Democrats' principal proponent was 
Michail Gorbachev, who advocated for an independent Russia; his main concern was not 
the United States but to establish a "unity in diversity regime, in which different nations 
and cultures might be able to maintain intense dialogue and cooperation by observing 
certain global1y acknowledged rules".4Û Compared to the National Democrals, the 
Statists' position, which argues that Russia must remain a great power, is the more 
popular. It argues that Russia should be motivated by its own interests, pursue power 
accumulation and maintain a significant global geopolitical presence. It also promotes the 
pursuit of strategie alliances out of concern that the nation risks overextending its 
considerable, but nonetheless limited material resources, for security purposes. Although 
the statist view is dominant at the moment, Russian discourse is not homogenous and has 
evolved through a competition between various schools of thought. Official1y, it 
progressed from one organizing metaphor to another: from Gorbachev's New Thinking to 
Strategie Partnership to Multipolar World. For example, Gorbachev decided that saving 
the economy required easing relations with the United States, and that required re­
39 Westernizers believe that Russia is part of the West and should integrate itself into Western economic 
and political institutions. The National Communists share similar assumptions with the Statists, but takes it 
a step further and believes that Russia's interests are totally incompatible with those of the West. FinalJy, 
the Expansionists advocate constant territorial expansion as the only way to survive. 
40 Tsygankov, op.cit, p 51 
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envisioning the Soviet Union's identity as a CoId War power. From a constructivist 
perspective, the initiating event was the redefinition of the Soviet Union's role from 
adversary to potential cooperator. The same transition can be said to characterize 
Russia's actions following the events of 9/11. Constructivists would claim that if hard­
line nationalists were to come to power in Russia and redefine its role from frequent 
cooperation to expansionist adversary, its interests would again emphasize armed forces 
and security concerns. Such a change would affect understandings of other states and 
redefine their roles from cooperative to defensive adversaries, and they would then re­
emphasize military power. 
As one can observe, the constructivist approach is much more complex and 
detailed than the neorealist approach. However, the diversity of both approaches and their 
similarities will enable us to better understand the actions of Russia facing NATO 
expansIOn. 
lA Two schools ofthought: Neorealism and Constructivism (overview) 
Before applying these theories to our analysis, it would be useful to sum up the 
maIn similarities and differences between the approaches. First, both neorealism and 
constructivism see the state as the most important actor in the international system. Both 
view the international system as anarchie, and both agree that the international system 
will shape and hamper state interests. Looking at the main differences, neorealism 
concentrates on state interests based on gaIns, rather than interests dependent on 
understanding relations among other states. Another difference is that neorealists 
concentrate on material factors, such as military and economic power, rather than 
focusing on state interactions or an understanding what shapes and constructs the roles 
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and interests of states. For constructivists, material factors depend on the intersubjective 
context. Thus, constructivists are more interested in the effects of norms and identities 
whereas neorealists focus on state calculations and security. 
In sorting through this tangled web, are two theories better than one? It will be 
argued that if we reaUy want to understand a situation, we need at least two theories: The 
use of more theories will broaden our perspective and understanding of Russia's behavior 
towards NATü's expansion under the auspice of U.S hegemony, and one theory can lead 
us to simple reductions and conclusions, whereas two theories will allow us to avoid the 
trap of overgeneralization and possible simplification. Alternate interpretations of 
Russian behavior will enable us to better comprehend the situation. And as we shall see, 
although both neorealism and constructivism share sorne core premises, their 
understandings of the situation can be quite opposite. Binding these theories together may 
simply overlook important elements of both approaches. 
Chapter II 
Historical Overview 
2.1 North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) 
The relationship between NATO and Russia is complex and a brief historical 
overview is necessary to establish the complexities of their fragile rapport. From NATO's 
inception, April 4th 1949, the relationship between the organization and Russia was 
adversarial, with NATO's very raison d'être the protection of its members against the 
expansion of the Soviet Union. This adversarial foundational dynamic continues to 
characterize the relationship. After the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO created the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was charged with the goal of creating a 
consultative forum in which Central and Eastern European countries were invited to 
participate. The NACC was seen as a "temporary mechanism to deal with former 
adversaries.,,41 Despite being a consultative forum, it had significant drawbacks for 
Russia and Russian participation was therefore limited. 
The NACC's purpose and objectives were not well-defmed. NACC did not grant 
Russia any special status, nor did it grant Russia any decision-making powers. In fact, 
Russia did not trust NATO's declared intentions, but felt the West was trying to reduce 
Russia's influence by reducing the power of security institutions in which Russia played 
an important l'ole, such as the Organization for Security cooperation in Europe (OSCE)42. 
41 Ponsel Lionel: Russia, NATO, and Cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap. New York: Routledge, 2007, 
p65 
42 Ibid 
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2.2 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) was created to encourage bilateral cooperation 
between individual partner countries and NATO. The former Secretary of Defence for the 
United States, Les Aspin, believed that PfP "sets up the right incentives for those wishing 
to join [NATO]".43 Russia was not pleased and initially refused to join the PfP, believing 
that NATO was encouraging the future entry of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, crs members, in a clear challenge to Russian interest in the region. Russia 
eventually joined the PfP in June 1994, in hopes of minimizing the effects of expansion. 
As stated by one Russian scholar, "Russia finally joined PŒ in June 1994, hoping to 
transform it into a substitute for NATO membership for Central and East European states, 
rather than a mechanism to prepare them for membership.,,44 That same year, the 
Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) was created and given responsibility for 
coordinating joint military activities within the PŒ (ex. Bosnia). Nevertheless, Russia 
still argued that it had no voice within the organization. 
2.3 Permanent Joint Council (PJC) 
rn order to remedy to the situation and ensure greater Russian participation in 
European affairs, a new mechanism for consultation was created: the Founding Act, 
creating a separate forum, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). This was to 
provide a forum of consultation regarding security issues of concern to both NATO and 
Russia. The goal was to increase dialogue between both countries and to develop a joint 
program of security and defense cooperation wherein "the two paI1ies will consult and 
43 Quoted in, Ibid, p. 66 
44 Ibid, p67 
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strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree.,,45 Basically, the aim of the Act was to 
reassure Russia that it could enter into partnership with NATO. However, this Act, again, 
fell short of Russian expectations as it too did not give them enough of a say in NATO's 
internai affairs, having "a voice, not a veto.,,46 
2.4 G8 
Many analysts, journalists, professors and specialists would agree that the G8 
membership had been a pOOl' compensation for NATO expansion. While the former 
Russian president Boris Yeltsin was trying to calm the internai panic in his country 
produced by more talks of NATO expansion in 1997, former president Bill Clinton 
wanted Yeltsin to understand that Russia had an important l'ole ta play in the international 
arena, and the best way ta prove that, was by incorporating Russia into the G7 club. 
Clinton made it no secret, and told several of his personal council in 1997 "I1's real 
simple. As we push 01' Boris to do the right but hard thing on NATO, 1 want him to feel 
the warm, beckoning glow of doors that are opening to other institutions where he's 
welcome.,,47 Yeltsin was clearly misguided. Russia had to witness the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, the end of the Warsaw Pact alliances who literally fled from Russia in the 
arms of the West, its withdrawal from East Europe and finally, the removal of Russian 
military bases both in Cuba and Vietnam.48 Now, if this entire trauma was not enough, 
Russia was also required to accept NATO expansion. Anatol Lieven, a senior research 
fellow at the New America Foundation, said it best, when he argued that if the United 
States really wanted Russia to play a greater role in the international arena and if it really 
45 Ibid, p72 
46 Ibid, p70 
47 According to the memoir of Strobe Talbott, Clinton's top presidential aid, quoted in: Boykewich 
Stephen, "How Russia Got Into the Democratie Club", The Moscow Times July 14 th 2006, pl 
48 Ibid 
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wanted to compensate Russia for NATO expansIOn, then the president of the United 
States would have made a substantial offer that would be more representative then 
membership in the G7.49 Lieven does not give any examples, but one might consider 
giving a greater role to Russia in NATO or give Russia a significant economic 
compensation to help rebuilt its economy. 
2.5 Kosovo Crisis 
Many books have been written on the relationship between NATO-Russia and 
U.S relations. 50 It is not necessary to elaborate on this here, but it is fair to mention that 
the Kosovo crisis was a breaking point in the relationship between Russia and NATO, 
demonstrating clearly that Russia could not trust NATO. To prevent a possible veto of 
NATO action by Russia in the UN, the U.S. maintained that it should be possible to 
threatened or use force without explicit UN authorization (Article 51 of the UN Charter). 
As noted by Secretary Cohen at the time regarding a UN mandate: "The United States 
does not feel it's imperative. I1's desirable, not imperative."sl According to the Russians, 
NATO was clearly expanding its mandate in acting beyond the borders of member states. 
To Russian officiais, this raised the possibility of a NATO attack on Russia's near abroad 
or even on its own soil. Furthermore, NATO acted without the expressed sanction of the 
UN Security Council, creating still greater uncertainty. 
49 Quoted in, Ibid
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2.6 911 
After the events of 9/11, Moscow opened Russian airspace to US planes and 
offered enhanced military assistance to the Northem Alliance, NATO's ally in 
Afghanistan, such that the relationshi p between NATO and Russia seemed to have taken 
a tum for the better. Two days after the attacks in New York, the PJC met and issued a 
statement calling for closer cooperation between NATO and Russia in order to defeat 
terrorism. Putin's visit to Brussels in 2001 and his meetings with NATO Secretary 
General Lord Robertson marked a new chapter in this relationship. In time, the ptp was 
replaced by the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), with a mandate to focus on projects 
wherein Russia and NATO share common goals. However, the NRC functions on the 
principle of consensus, with members making joint decisions, yet Russia stililacks a veto 
as NATO reserves the right to remove any issue from the NRC and thus exclude Russia 
from the consultation table. This paper will elaborate on Russia's role after 911 later in 
chapter 4. 
2.7 Crisis in Georgia 
Several points of conflict have contributed to the current Georgian cns\s. In 
justifying its intervention, Russia claims that Georgia acted aggressively against Russian 
loyalists in South Ossetia, but it also objected earlier to both Georgia's bid to join NATO 
and the Pentagon's arming and training of the Georgian military. With strong backing 
from the George W. Bush administration, NATO promised Georgia, which Russia's 
considers part of its traditional sphere of influence, that it would one day be admitted to 
the alliance. Against that backdrop, Russia's military offensive in Georgia underscored 
the controversy of further NATO expansion, which Russia strongly opposes. Russia's 
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UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin emphasized this point at a news conference called to 
discuss the Georgia crisis: "We have never made a secret of the fact that we think NATO 
enlargement is wrong and that with every new wave of enlargement, new security issues 
are created, and there are better ways to deal with matters of regional European, Euro-
Atlantic security. More cooperative ways that would include, rather than exclude 
Russia."S2 Even before the Russian military moved into Georgia earlier in 2008, Russian 
Ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, was warning in interviews that an expansion of 
NATO to include nations bordering Russia would be unacceptable to Moscow: "There 
are NATO-Ukrainian relations, there are NATO-Georgian relations, but there are also 
NATO-Russia relations," Rogozin said. "It's all about the balance of interests. You have 
to take into consideration our point of view, and not approach a military machine close to 
our borders."S3 Although bereft of major energy resources itself, the former Soviet 
republic of Georgia serves as a strategic corridor through which oil and gas pipelines 
bring the rich reserves of the Caspian Sea to European and world markets. That corridor 
is patticularly important for Russia and for Gazprom. Georgia also happens to be one of 
the world's fastest-reforming democracies, uniquely situated between Russia, Turkey and 
Iran. According to the CUITent President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili, who came to 
power in Georgia's 2003 "Rose Revolution," Georgia's main foreign-policy priority IS 
membership in NATO. s4 
52 Quoted in Potts Nina Marie, "Russian Invasion of Georgia Raises Questions Over Extending NATO 
191hMembership", Brussels, August 2008, available at http://wwv..vo<lnews.com 'en!!.1ish/ rcilivè'?OU ­
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5JQuoted in, Ibid 
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From this short history, it is clear that Russia's relations with NATO are a 
complex matter. NATO's operations in Yugoslavia and NATO's failure to consult with 
Russia over its actions and the clear violation of NATO's long-standing claim to be a 
solely defensive organization were quite worrying for Russia. Membership in the 
Founding Act and the ptp provided poor compensation for NATO's expansion and made 
it is clear that Russian opinion counted for little. It is difficult to say in what direction the 
NRC will progress, but if we take into account what happened in the past, it might not 
look promising for Russia. This short history will now help us to evaluate Russia's 
actions with regards to NATO and will be returned to for further analysis throughout this 
paper. 
Chapter III
 
Russia's Alliances
 
Before exploring Russia's search for alliances, it would be interesting to look at 
the material capabilities of the U.S and its fellow NATO members compared to Russia. 
Since according to the neorealist perspective, the possibility of astate to maximize its 
power will ultimately affect the balance of power in the international system. Looking at 
the military and economic capabilities of Russia's main opponent, will enable us to 
understand Russia's reaction. Furthermore, looking at both the economic and military 
aspects will help us understand the reasons that pushed Russia to choose its alliances in 
"opposing" the United States and its NATO allies. As we shall see, according to 
neorealists, Russia should indeed be frightened at the expansion of NATü under U.S 
umbrella. 
3.1 Military Capabilities 
Neorealists argue that the structure of the international system is determined by 
arrangements of military power. Coercion, or the threat of it, is the driving force behind 
state calculations and security is a main state concern. States determine the status of their 
security by evaluating their capabilities against those of other states. Unfavorable 
balances are cause for concern and because the system is anarchie, there is nothing to 
stop states with superior capabilities from exploiting less powetful states. Since the 
United States is the hegemon, and as established earlier, they are the dominant force 
guiding the decisions of NATa. It is only natural for Russia, according to this theory, to 
be wary for its safety. 
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There are several definitions of "power". For this paper, two definitions will be 
taken from c1assical realist Hans Morgenthau and neorealist's Kenneth Waltz. In his 
work Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau argued that the relative power of astate 
can be measured according to its natural resources, geography, industrial capabilities, 
military capabilities, and population,55 According to Waltz, several other factors are also 
useful in measuring a state's power; these include a state's geography and population, 
military resources, and economic and political stability.56 What is imp0l1ant in the 
definitions of both authors is ultimately the quantitative aspect of power: that is, anything 
that can be measured and used in war. Applying these measures to the bipolarity of the 
Cold War, it can be seen that the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a 
relative stalemate, meaning that both sides had access to much the same quantities of 
resources, and both were capable of destroying each other. After the CoId War, the 
United States became the ultimate hegemon, or as John Ikenberry notes, the U.S became 
the unipolar actor as the USSR folded and the structure of the international system 
skewed in favour of the United States: 
[After the end of the Cold War] the distribution of world power took a dramatic turn in 
America's favor. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline of ideological rivalry, 
lagging economic fortunes in Japan and continental Europe, growing disparities in military and 
technological expenditure, and America's booming economy ail intensified power disparities 
during the J990s [ ... ] a decade of American rising power.57 
55 Morgenthau Hans, « Elements of National Power ». Chapter in Politics Among Nations. The Struggle 
rdfor Power and Peace, 3 ed. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1962, p. 106-144.
 
56 Waltz Kenneth, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics" Ibid, p. 50.
 
57 Ikenberry John G., « Getting Hegemony Right », The Nationallnterest, n° 63 (Spring 2001), p. J 7.
 
34 
In 2008, according to the Federation of American Scientists, Russia had 13,000 
warheads whereas the US had 9,400. 58 The estimate for the numbers of the Russian 
stockpile cornes with considerable ambiguity since it is based on CoId War levels, but 
since 1991, several thousands must have been dismantled or become dysfunctional. One 
might presume that Russian nuclear stockpiles are now equal to those of the US, but if we 
add the weapons of Russia's potential allies - India and China - Russia may still hold a 
numerical advantage over the US even if we add, in turn, ail NATO stockpiles to the 
American side of the ledger. 59 However, nuclear power alone does not make a state a 
great power. As noted by Georges Bali, the reta1iatory threat is a "cosmic bluff,.6ü But 
nuclear weapons arsenals are not the only leverage available, for as history, and Russian 
history in particular has shown, one must a1so account for military might. ln this respect, 
the United States has the lead by far. The numbers on military spending are telling. ln 
billions of dollars, the United States in 2008 spent $711, about 48.28% of the world total; 
next was China with $121.9, Russia with $70, Iran $7.2, and India $22.4. Simply put, US 
military spending is greater than the next 46 highest spending countries in the world 
combined, 5.8 times that of China, 10.2 times more than Russia's, and 98.6 more than 
lran's.61 This is a major concern for Russia. Even though Russia and its "allies", may 
combine forces, US military might is still dominant. And according to neorealists, 
maximizing state security imp1ies that military requirements are more important than 
economic capabilities should the two come into conflict. 
58 Status of World Nuclear Forces 2009, Federation of American Scientists, available at 
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What this means for Russia, is that it must continue to seek "allies" in order to 
counter the US hegemon along with its NATO members, and to develop its economy in 
order to acquire more power. As Waltz stated, any attempt to reverse a state's decline, 
62has to rely on economic means. Although material factors alone do not decide the 
outcomes of war, there remains no doubt that the odds of success are substantially higher 
if one possesses them, especially in protracted wars of attrition when strategy is reduced 
to an attempt to grind down one's opponent through sheer material superiority.63 
Furthermore, one must also look at how a state will use its military might and consider 
also its economic capabilities. Gilpin defines power as resources that combined the 
"military, economic, and technological capabilities of states".64 This means that power in 
neorealist terms is not only translated into military might, but must also consider 
economic capacity. 
3.2 Economie capability 
If a country wants to compete against a rising or current hegemon, it must be able 
to do so not only in military capabilities but also economically. This logic is fairly 
simple: if a country's economic capabilities are in decline, there will be less investment 
in the purchase of arms and in the building of a great army. Such was the situation in 
Russia following the end of the Cold War. Russia found itself in a time of great economic 
reconstruction and unable to maintain past military prowess. Russia still has the resources 
and military weapons (nuclear) to be considered a great power and to counter the 
hegemonic power of the US. Although Russia is trying to counter the hegemonic 
62 Waltz, op.cit, "the emerging structure of the international Politics", p52 
63 Mearsheimer Jonh J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W Norton & company, 2003, p 58-59 
64 Gilpin Robert, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, P 13. 
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tendencies of the United States through alliances, its own, independent economlc 
situation is better, even if still precarious. In order to compete with a hegemon, Russia's 
economic situation must improve still further, especially in comparisons with that of the 
United States. The Global Competitiveness Report puts Russia far behind the United 
States. Russia's GOP (in US billions) in 2007 as 1 289.6 and GOP pel' capita at 9075.1 
for a GOP as share percentage ofworld total at 3.18%.65 Compared to that of the United 
States GDP (in billions) in 2007 13,843.8 and GDP per capita 45,845.5 for a total GDP as 
share percentage of world total of 21.36%.66 Clearly, Russia has not yet achieved 
equality, particularly if we bring the economic strength of America's allies to bear, so 
Russia must take steps if it wants ta compete, or even defend itself and be taken 
seriously. 
Key strategic alliances also depend on the importance of economic might. In 
arder to counteract the power of the United States, it would be strategically wise to make 
key economic alliances that could ultimately be very economically beneficial to Russia. 
A balanced coalition against the United States would also have to rely on important 
economic gains in order ta prevent the US from achieving quasi complete economic 
control over the world. Waltz's theory emphasizes the impoliance of security issues in 
neorealism, but the role of economy can be tenned as a security issue. Indeed, a number 
of balancing strategies have been used in the past in order to weaken a state's ability ta 
create wealth and accumulate power (such as the use of boycotts, sanctions or blockades). 
From Russia's perspective, the United States and its NATO allies together form a very 
65 Porter E Michael & Schab Klaus, "The Global Competitiveness Report 200&-2009", World Economie 
Forum, Geneva Switzerland, 200&, p 301 
66 Ibid, P 353 
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strong economic structure. As seen above, the military might of the United States is 
overwhelming, and combined with that of NATO countries, all this military equipment 
can be purchased easily and thus becomes even more frightening. Professor and specialist 
in political economy, Mark R. Brawley points out, economic ties can make alliances 
more realistic: "Alliances can harness the mutually beneficial aspects of international 
economic policies to make themselves more successful and more militarily powerful. If 
trade or international investment makes both parties better off, then such activities should 
be diverted from the threatening power. External balancing should redirect trade towards 
alliance members".67 As neorealists point out, alliances are intended to balance power 
and increase security. If Russia can gain in economic terms, it will also gain in military 
terms. 
It is important to mention here, that for a neorealist, the main role of institutions is 
to serve the interests of the most powerful states. This also faUs into the realm of 
economic institutions. There is a correlation between NATO as a security organization 
and other economic institutions (such as WTO, World Bank, etc.). According to 
neorealist thought, these economic institutions serve the interests of the United States. In 
the words of Waltz "the United States makes the rules and maintains the institutions that 
shape the international political economy.,,68 Viewed from the Russian perspective, the 
US appears not only to control military institutions but economic ones as weil. For 
example, the system of aerial defense, BALTNET, created by the American company 
Lockheed Martin for the Baltic States. Apart from BALTNET, three other joint Estonian­
67Brawley Mark. "The Political Economy of Balance of Power Theory" in Balance of Power: Theory and 
Practice in the 21st Century, edited by T.V. Paul, Jim Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Stanford University 
Press, 2004, p 81 
68 Waltz Kenneth, "Globalization and Governance" Columbia University, PS Online, December 1999, p 7 
38 
Latvian-Lithuanian military projects have been funded and overseen by the United States: 
BALTBAT (an infantry battalion), BALTRON (a naval squadron) and BALTDEFCOL 
(the Baltic Defence College). If Ukraine or Georgia enters NATO, serious economic 
relief will be given by the United States along with substantial and valuable military 
contracts. Given ail this is happening in Russia's backyard, Russia should, according to 
neorealist thinking to be thinking about boosting its economic might if it wants to stand a 
chance against US encroachment in the region. 
Russia 's alliances 
According to Waltz, alliances form due to changes in the structure of the 
international system and are able to counterbalance rising powers that threaten that 
balance of power. For Waltz, an excessive accumulation of capabilities will result in 
greater threats to others in the international system and lead to counterbalancing 
alliances. As seen previously, the United States has the wealth and capabilities to 
influence organizations such as NATÜ, and in the eyes of the Russians, that cOl1stitutes a 
major threat. This represents one instance in which astate, according to neorealists, will 
cooperate. The second instance is when certain concessions are made to compensate the 
state when it enters into an agreement in which one state achieves a relative gain. For 
example, in cases of economic or military gain, states seeking security can enter into 
cooperative arrangements with other states. The following section will look at Russia's 
search for alliances to counter US hegemony and diminish US influence within NATÜ. 
As we shall discover, potential Russian partners Iran, China, and India have their 
own reasons to be skeptical of NATü expansion and reservations about US intentions. 
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But these partnerships not only share sorne of Russia's concerns, they also bring Russia 
significant profit and political influence on the international scene. 
3.3 Iran as an ally 
Promoting multipolarity through external alliances is a viable way for Russia to 
reaffirm its status as a great power and play an active role in the international system. 
CUlTently, Moscow sees Iran as a valuable partner in responding to regional security 
challenges, and as a partner in wider political and strategic ventures. By supporting this 
"rogue" state-so termed by the United States-Russia acquires influence and the 
accoutrements of a great power - a considerable boon given that Russia wants to be 
known and acknowledged as a major player on the international scene, just as Iran wishes 
to assert greater influence regionally and be accorded greater respect. In pursuit of these 
ends, Russia has positioned itself as the go-between for the US and Iran-always a 
fraught relationship, but lately one of increased importance-thus increasing its 
influence, stature, and usefulness to Washington and other NATO countries, and to Iran 
and other "rogue" states. 
The mam problem with Russia's relationship to Iran is that NATO has been 
seeking to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons while Russia states that it 
opposes an Il'anian bomb and yet aids in the construction of a nuclear reactor at Bushehr 
and opposes the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran. Indeed, Russia 
refused to listen to American advice and in September 2005, the Russian Foreign 
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Ministry stated it was opposed to reporting Iran to the UN Security Council. 69 With this 
type of rhetoric, Russia is clearly siding with Iran and not the US. Without sanctions, 
there are no incentives left for Iran to change its policy and thus, Russia, knowing that the 
US needs its cooperation to exert pressure on Iran, is again setting up itself as an 
important player on the international scene even though the gambit could further strain 
security relations with NATO. NATO's member states are engaged in a process of 
developing policies for arms control and disarmament. With Russia's US$700 million 
contract with Iran in 2005 for surface-to-air missiles for the defense of Iran's nuclear 
installations, Russia is sending a clear signal to NATO and the United States that Russia 
can choose its own alliances. 7o 
Such attempts at rapprochement do not rule out international conflict. Both Russia 
and Iran have opposed NATO's eastward expansion and denounced its military 
intervention in the world's hot-spots without a clear UN mandate, seeing a more assertive 
NATO as a source of international instability, not an international policing force. Defense 
analyst Pavel Felgengauer, who describes the Russo-Iranian relationship as a strategie 
one, notes: "NATO's expansion is making Russia look around hurriedly for at least sorne 
kind of strategie allies. In this situation, the anti-Western and anti-America regime in Iran 
would be a natural and very important partner.,,71 In an interview, Russia's ambassador 
to Tehran, Konstantin Shuvalov, declared a "common opposition to unipolarity as the 
foundation of Russio-Iranian relations [ ... ] We support a democratic multi polar order 
69Braun Aurel, Ed, NATO-Russia Relations in the Twenty-First Century, edited by, Routledge, New York,
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which will guarantee the interests of aIl nations."n The relationship between Iran and 
NATO has not been amicable, especially given the United States' economic sanctions on 
Iran and American criticism of Iran for supporting Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad. 73 
Among other considerations, the alliance with Iran offers Russia political and 
economic dividends, but here security matters are of primary importance. Hence Iran's 
refusai to comment on the activities and Russian policies in Chechnya and its support of 
the former Yugoslavia is unsurprising, as is Russia's status as Iran's main source of 
weapons systems despite protests from the United States. The sale to Iran of arms and 
nuclear reactors helps Russia's cash-strapped military-industrial complex while equipping 
Iran with much desired modern technology unavailable elsewhere. Overall trade between 
Iran and Russia has grown significantly over the years, rising to US$2.02 billion in 2005, 
compared to only $661 million in 2000.74 Russian expolts to Iran, mostly in conventional 
weapons, military equipment and cars, reached $1.9 billion in 2005. 75 Furthermore, 
situated in a region that holds enormous energy resources and offers the possibility of 
controlling expOlt routes to outside markets, Russia and Iran combined would enjoy 
control over enormous energy reserves and production sites, making them a formidable 
economic power. In terms of population, the organization could, potentially, represent 
over 200 million people. 
Economically, Iran and Russia control the energy resources of Russia, Iran and 
the Caucasus, plus the manufacturing might of the Chinese and burgeoning service 
72 Ambrosio Thomas, Challenging America's Global Preeminence: Russia's Ouest fOi Multipolaritv, North 
Dakoda State University USA, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005, P 91 
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industries of India that makes it a great economic power. 76 The International Transport 
Corridor (ITC), which was established with the collaboration of India, Russia, and Iran, 
extends Russia's geopolitical influence by further reinforcing economic relations between 
Russia and those two rising powers. 77 With the Russian space/mili tary industrial complex 
behind them, this alliance could become a formidable world power. 
Geographically, the Russians consider closer relations with Iran to be a major 
strategie move because an unfriendly America could aid the Iranians, regardless of their 
current relationship, in stining up trouble. Since Iran is the key to the Persian Gulf and 
could act as a buffer against an American advance from Iraq and Afghanistan towards 
Russia's southern borders, an alliance with Iran is key to maintaining Russian security. 
Russia and Iran are also working together to check the influence of the United 
States and its allies (for example Turkey) in Central Asia and the Caucasus, as weIl as to 
restrain the Taliban's brand of religious extremism in Afghanistan. As noted by Ali 
Ahmad Jalali, chief of the Farsi Service of the Voice of America in Washington, Iran's 
partnerships with Russia and Armenia are seen by both Iran and Russia as direct 
responses to US effOlts to cultivate influence in the region through its ties with Turkey, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan. 78 This configuration of forces also plays a crucial 
role in pipeline poli tics, which brings the "north-south axis against the east-west 
corridor".79 The Russian-Iranian association also provides bilateral security msurance 
through concerted responses to common challenges ranging from U.S penetration of the 
76 Maunk Allister, "Economic Cooperation Between Russia and India", Axis Information and Analysis, 
2005, available at http:'/\\ww.;)\js'llobc.c( rn/articlc.' p'laniclc 111. Trâde between lndia and Russia has 
reached nearly 5 billion dollars in 2005 
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78Jalali A. Ali, "The Strategic Partnership of Russia and Iran", Parameters, USA Army War College 
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region to the proliferation of unfriendly religious extremism and instability deriving from 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Russia clearly seeks to exploit the strategie 
advantages offered by Iran's oil reserves and geographicallocation to its advantage. 
3.4 Forging ties with China 
A second important Russian alliance to consider is China. Forging a working 
strategie partnership with such a large, emerging power, with its own concerns about U.S. 
power and influence would provide obvious advantages to both parties. The rationale for 
such an alliance is clear: both Russia and China are disturbed by the new, unipolar 
structure of the international system and by America's hegemonic tendencies, and in 
arder to counter America's global power and protect their own interests, both states have 
committed themselves to the promotion of a multipolar international system. In the 
international arena, Russia has tried to strengthen its position by joining forces with 
China through the Shanghai Five - possibly the most significant indication of the new 
"Russo-Chinese anti-American alliance". This organization, created in 1996 as an 
attempt at "deepening military trust at the border regions" and promoting cooperation on 
terrorism and security, includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 8o 
In 2001, the group admitted Uzbekistan as a new member, renamed the organization, and 
signed the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In the words of 
then Chinese President Jiang Zemin, this Organization would foster "world multi­
polarization".81 The organization's charter stated that its goal was to "maintain a global 
strategie balance and stability."s2 In the same year, Russia and China signed the Treaty of 
80 Ambrosio, op.cit, p 87 
81 Ibid 
82 Ibid 
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Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation with the aim of "deepening relations of 
strategie partnership" based on their "similar appraisals of the international situation.,,83 
This organization intended to curb D.S influence in the region, and in Section VI 
of the Dushanbe statement, issued jointly by ail of the members, they vow to "oppose 
intervention in other countries' internaI affairs on the pretexts of 'humanitarianism' and 
'protecting human rights;' and support the efforts of one another in safeguarding the five 
countries' national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and social stability.,,84 
Chinese President Jiang Zemin even added: "[W]e should strengthen mutual support in 
safeguarding the national unity and sovereignty of our nations and resist ail kinds of 
threat to the security of the region.,,85 There are also more subtle, implicit references 
aimed at D.S. policy in the statement, which note the group's opposition to the "use of 
force or threat of force in international relations without the UN Security Council's prior 
approval and ... any countries or groups of countries' attempt to monopolize global and 
regional affairs out of selfish interests. ,,86 The Dushanbe statement also states its 
opposition to D.S. missile defenses by stating its strong support for the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) and its opposition to "bloc-based" deployment of theater missile defense 
systems in the Asia-Pacific region, notably in Taiwan. 87 Needless to say that China made 
use of the statement to send a message to the U.S. regarding Taiwan. 
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In 2002, the official charter of sco was signed by ail members. In 2004, 
Mongolia was admitted as an observer and, in 2005, Iran, India and Pakistan also 
received observer status. With these additions, the SCO is evolving from a regional 
economic and security organization into something else. And if these observer states 
were to in fact join the SCO, it would have the potential to become one of the most 
influential organizations in the world. 88 
Chinese and Russians often speak of military concerns -- such as America's plan 
to pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), which has been frequently 
cited and no doubt provided motivation for implementing closer relations. 89 The fact that 
the United States unilaterally decided to abrogate the agreement, and the inability of both 
Russia and China to prevent it, provided a clear indication that the US considered its 
actions to be unconstrained by international rivais, leaving it from to act as it wished. 
Although the Russo-Chinese agreement was not based solely on military concerns, the 
document nevertheless includes a subtle version of a military alliance. Several provisions 
(including Articles VII, VIII, and IX) deal with cooperative military responses to security 
and territorial threats. 90 Article IX stipulates that if "confronted with the threat of 
aggression, the contracting parties shaH immediately hold contacts and consultations in 
arder to eliminate such threats,,;91 This does not make the arrangement a military alliance 
per se, such that an attack on one is an attack on ail, but it can be construed in such a 
manner if bath parties are in agreement, if the right situation presents itself. 
88 Bakhtiar Abbas, "Cold War Il'', Scoop lndependenl News, Friday June 30 lh 2006, pA available al: 
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Clearing the decks of past tensions and laying a foundation for future cooperation, 
in August 2005, Russia and China settled disputes over their borders and carried out joint 
military exercises. One of the objectives of these joint exercises was aimed at countering 
the United States' "monopoly in world affairs."n In 2007, the SCO counterterrorism 
exercises that involved 6500 troops from all the members of the organization. Russia and 
China are the ones that sent the most troops, with Russia sending 2000 troops. These 
exercises sent a clear message to the U.S, that the SCO was in "control" of Central Asia, 
and that the presence of Americans was not welcome. This point by the SCO members 
could not be clearer: they refused Washington's observer status. Washington was not 
allowed near the SCO military exercises. China and Russia are making an important 
statement, by sending a message to Washington that both countries are ready to affirm 
their interests near their borders and more specifically in Central Asia. Russia even went 
further, when it announced it's restoration of "long-range patrolling by nuclear-capable 
strategie bombers" which were widely used during the Cold War.9J 
The SCO sees U.S presence in Afghanistan as a serious nUisance and wants 
American withdrawal as wel1 as NATO allies. And Uzbekistan simply closed down the 
U.S air base Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan, one of the SCO members, is demanding more 
money from the U.S for the use of their military air base. The interesting factor here is 
that it only increased its rent to the U.S and not to Russia, who is enjoying the use of the 
air base for free. 94 
92 De Haas, Marcel. "Russia-China Security Cooperation." (EN) Online publication, Power and Interest 
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Thus, it can easily be argued that these exerclses were meant to show the 
Americans that both Russia and China were forces to be reckoned with in the Central 
Asia and that any interference in the area could have potential consequences. Russia's 
fear of encirclement is mirrored in China, especially in light of events in the aftermath of 
9111 and given the presence of US forces in Central Asia. 
Russo-Chinese military cooperation recently reached record levels with Russia 
becoming China's primary supplier of modern weapons and military technology. ln 1997, 
Russian arms sales to China totaled US$l billion, an amount that continued to rise 
throughout the remainder of the decade.95 The success of the defense industry only 
underscores the missing elements of an economic partnership. The April 1996 summit 
statement, for example, announced an overall goal of growing trade between the two 
sides to $20 billion by the end of the century and identified projects of interest in energy, 
large-scale construction, and nuclear power as priorities for matching the momentum and 
scale of defense efforts,96 and Putin's July 2000 visit to China resulted in agreements on 
feasibility studies on gas and oil pipelines from Siberia to China. This is driven, in part, 
by China's transformation, during the last decade, from an energy exporter to importer. 
Russia's determination to capitalize on world oil and gas prices inflated - in part - by 
China's consumption, has translated into a much more vigorous approach to diversifying 
markets and pipeline routes. Russia's National Energy Strategy envisages that by 2020 
the share of its total oil exports to Asia will rise to 30% (and gas exports by up to 15%) 
from the current 3%. lt further anticipates that China will account, by far, for the largest 
95 Ambrosio, op.eit p 84 
96 Gamett Sherman, "Challenges of the Sino Russian Strategie Partnership", Washington Quarter!y 24.4, 
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proportion of this inerease.97 Thus, Russia's strategie alliance with China will not only 
lead bring it significant eeonomic gains, but will also counter US influence. 
China's negative attitude towards NATO expansion has been evident since the 
beginning of NATO enlargement, and parallels those of the Russians: America is 
strengthening its grasp over Europe and entrenching its hegemonie status by accepting 
new members into the alliance and providing them with security guarantees as well as 
selling them military equipment. China is much concerned about the current hegemonic 
power of the United States and prefers a multipolar system. At the same time, China 
perceives a possibility of NATO expansion into its sphere of influence, particularly given 
Japan's military cooperation with the United States and with the growing role of the US 
in the global economy. Thus China pays close attention to its geostrategic and economic 
situation in order to dilute American unilateralism. The United States has been seeking, 
or maintaining, military bases close to the Chinese border in Mindanao, Okinawa, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan. China, to counter U.S moves on the political front, had to 
make sure to consolidate its eeonomic ties with ASEAN member states. A further 
complication, according to the government in Beijing, of NATO enlargement wou Id be 
inevitable complications regarding China's access to the European market due to trade 
tensions between the Chinese and the United States. Finally, another plausible reason 
against NATO expansion under the US umbrella is that China would not be able to 
acquire modern weapons from the Czech Republic or France. If China-US relations 
deteriorated, China would have to rely exclusively on Russia for the supply of advanced 
arms. Regardless of which ally astate purchases weapons from, an ally today can become 
97 CLSA, "China and RlIssia: Common interests, contrasting perceptions" Asian Geopolitics, Special 
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your foe tomorrow. Thus, relying only on one source to buy your military equipment can 
become a risk. The last strew, for China, was the invasion of Kosovo, during which 
China perceived the US as using NATO for its own ends without the accord of the UN 
and, in violating the sovereignty of Yugoslavia, showed what the United States could do 
with NATO under its control. Add to this the U.S-led NATO bombing of China's 
embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and reasons for China's resentment towards NATO 
abound. 
3.5 Cementing ties with lndia 
Few remember that India and Russia share a historical link that dates back to the 
19th Century, when the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva were integrated into the 
Romanov Empire.98 Although good relations were maintained between these two 
countries, it was not until the signing of the "Indo-Soviet Treaty, Friendship and 
Cooperation" in 1971 that ties were cemented. This treaty contained significant security 
clauses and arose, at least in pat1, to contain the growing pOV\iers of China and Pakistan. 
For example, Al1icle 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty stipulated that there should be military 
cooperation in the event of a military threat to either party.99 Initially, the common 
denominator was the containment of China and Pakistan and countering the rise of 
American influence in Asia. Relations between India and China have always been 
difficult, and India still remembers the 1962 war with Pakistan over the disputed territory 
of Kashmir. FUl1hermore, America's interests in Pakistan, which they famously described 
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as "America's most allied ally ID Asia", IS cause for concern from an Indian 
perspective. loo 
In what Gorbachev called his "new China policy," Gorbachev called for "an end 
to a China encirclement policy."IOl That policy survived the break up of the USSR, and in 
2000, Russia's foreign policy document ref1ected the shift: "The concurrence of the 
fundamental approaches of Russia and the People's Republic of China to the key issues 
ofworld problems is one of the mainstays ofregional and global stability. Russia seeks to 
develop mutually advantageous cooperation with China in ail areas." 102 However, 
Russia's strategie shift in its foreign policy towards China places India in an awkward 
position. Under Gorbachev, the Soviets changed their stance towards China. On its 
alliance with India, Russia declared that it "intends to strengthen its traditional friendship 
with lndia, including in the international affairs and to aid overcome problems persisting 
in South Asia and strengthen stability in the region." 103 One might note the nuance in 
both statements and how Russia came to characterize its relationship with India as a 
'traditional friendship'. 
Another consideration is Afghanistan. India and Russia are both interested in 
trying to contain, as much as possible, the spread of Islamic revivalism and to control the 
f10w of arms in and out of the country as any turbulence in AfghanLstan could have 
undesirable effects on India's Kashmir and Russia's Chechen rebels. Given its particular 
100 Tillin Louise, "India and Russia's corn mon past", BBC News World Edition, December 4'11 2002, p. 1­
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strategie interests, India's vision for a possible solution to the Afghan problem differs 
from that of the United States. The Indian position on the Taliban, shared by Russia, was 
that no member of the ruling party should be allowed to join in the formation of a new 
government, whereas, initially, the United States eonsidered a Pakistani proposition that 
"moderate" Taliban members be integrated beeause the Pashtuns - from whom most of 
the Taliban are drawn - are the largest single ethnie group in Afghanistan. Only after the 
Northern Alliance took the Western coalition by surprise and moved into Kabul on 
November 13 th , did President Bush finally agreed with Russia and India that no members 
of the Taliban should be allowed to join the new government. 104 However, India feels at 
times that its opinions are not important to the eyes of the United States. 
Russian defense minister Ivanov told reporters in February 2000 that the Kremlin 
would "uneonditionally" support India if it faeed a eonfliet with Pakistan. 105 This 
statement represents a huge eommitment from Russia and clearly shows the world where 
Russia stands, and that Russia is prepared to aet if the situation demands it. 
Furthermore, India and Russia have a lot to gain from one another through trade, 
espeeially in military equipment. Before the faU of the Soviet empire, 70% of India's 
military imports came from the USSR. 106 In 1992 Russia granted India credit worth 
US$830 million for the purehase of special military equipment. ,07 Trade eontinued after 
the eollapse of the USSR, and in 2005 India purehased $5.4 billion in weapons: 108 a trade 
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sufficient to keeping approximately 800 Russian defense production facilities In 
operation. 109 
To demonstrate support of India, Russia also made it explicit that it would support 
that country's bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. In 200 l, a 
representative of the foreign affairs department told reporters that Russia considers India 
"the strongest and most deserving candidate for becoming a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council."IIO 
Another important factor is India's need for energy, and with Russia's energy 
surplus, both India and Russia have grounds for cooperation, particularly given the 
growing importance of oil in the future. The Indian investment in the Sakhal in-l project 
is bringing approximately US$l billion to India, making it the country's largest foreign 
investment anywhere in the world. India is also seeking more investments in Russia in 
the upstream oil and gas sector to ensure reliable long-term energy security.lll While 
looking to benefit from India's growing market for Russian exports of oil and gas, and 
ultimately to get part of a share in the downstream oil and gas business in India, Russia is 
also helping India build the Kudankulam nuclear power plant and has recently supplied 
fuel for Tarapur, despite V.S opposition. On top of this, Russia is looking for a large 
109 Subhash, op.cit, p 7 
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share of the anticipated increase in nuclear energy projects in India that could bring a 
. l f 112substantIa amount 0 money. 
With regards to NATO, India is a non-aligned country. lt shares, however, the 
concems of Russia, China, and Iran over NATO's presence in Afghanistan, and in having 
little say over NATO's plans to stabilize the current conflict in that area. Also worrying, 
since NATO sent a relief mission to Pakistan following a devastating earthquake in 2005, 
Pakistan and NATO have enjoyed warrner relations. And, as the US often reiterates, 
NATO regards Pakistan as an important ally in its fight against terrorism. Considering the 
relationship and the long history between Pakistan and India, it is understandable that 
lndia has sorne concerns regarding NATO. First, because NATO is an organization led 
, by the United States and secondly, because it consorts with its neighbor Pakistan and 
does not agree with NATO's expansion towards Russia's borders. IIJ 
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Chapter IV 
Russia's behavior: The neorealist and constructivist views 
From a neorealist perspective, one can argue that Russia's post-Cold War foreign 
policy vis a vis the US is inherently concerned with the structure of the international 
system and once again balancing the power of the US. Changing the international system 
from a bipolar to a unipolar structure has affected how states provide for their security. 
An overwhelming power, such as the United States, causes other states, including Russia, 
to attempt to redress the imbalance by various means. When analyzing Russia's reaction 
towards the U.S led NATO alliance, it can be seen that Russia has attempted to enhance 
its own relative position in an anarchie system by improving its national, economic and 
military condition by allying itself with strategie pal1ners capable of helping to counter 
the power of the United States. Its alliances with Iran, China, and India are the primary 
means by which Russia is seeking to re-institute a multipolar system and to benefit from 
its military and economic maneuvers and investments. 
Russia's interruption of gas supplies to the Ukraine and Georgia in 2006 and its 
shells raining down on Georgia during the conflict over Ossetia could be viewed as 
attempts to prevent and control Ukraine's and Georgia's capacity to integrate NATO. 
Russia's choices of allies; Iran, China, and India, and its behavior throughout the 
international system are thus weil explained by neorealists. To understand Russia's 
behavior towards the current hegemon, the United States, and to understand how the US 
is using NATO to fUl1her its interests are essential elements in predicting what wi Il 
55 
happen next. Neorealists predict that "balances disrupted will one day be restored,,114 and 
Waltz was correct when he asserted that no theory can predict "when" but it can predict 
how. As mentioned preciously, unipolarity is the least durable of international 
configurations as weaker states will soon worry about Arnerican encroachment. We can 
see this behavior not only in Russia, India, Iran, or China, but we can also look towards 
Europe and recognize similar elements in how France and Germany, for example, viewed 
the Arnerican invasion of Iraq. It should be noted that both of these states even disagreed 
on NATO expansion towards Russia. Russia might not become the next hegemon, but to 
protect its interests it will do what it must survive, and that will include balancing US 
power. Does this mean that Russia would be ready to go to war to counter the US and 
ensure that NATO no longer poses a threat? Although this sounds unlikely, if the current 
situation regarding NATO expansion is not addressed in ways that satisfy all parties 
involved, we could see history repeat itself. According to neorealist theory, we are 
witnessing a change in the structure of the international system and the probability of 
conflict is great. 
4.1 Critiques ofthe neorealist explanation 
Although neorealism offers an informative analysis of Russia's reaction to NATO 
expansion, it fails to offer satisfactory explanations of a number of fundamental 
problems. First, because the alliances with Iran and China are driven solely by 
considerations of the balance of power, neorealism offers little assistance in making sense 
of the timing of the relationship. Why would Russia choose to enter into a relationship 
114 Waltz, op. cit "Structural Realism after the Cold War", p27 
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with Iran and China now, and not in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, as one 
might expect if power balances were truly the prime factor in the international system? 
Perhaps they didn't expect the U.S. to forgo the benefits of a peace dividend in order to 
enjoy a clear supremacy of power? One might argue that Russia di d, in fact, begin to 
move at the close of the Cold War. Although relations between China and Russia have 
been troubled at times, in 1991, the Chinese and the Russians signed a protocol in which 
both sides committed themselves to developing "good neighborly" relations and peaceful 
co-existence. 115 From that point, relations between the pair warmed. The same can be 
said of Russia's relations with Iran, to whom weapons sales began in the early 1990s, 
immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 116 Thus, it can be argued that 
immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia began to take measures to 
assure its security and interests. 
Second, these bilateral relationships are marked by intermittent efforts by China 
and Russia to reach out to the United States, even as they work to resolve their mutuaI 
differences. If both China and Russia, in spite of their intentions, seek to balance 
themselves against the stronger state for structural reasons, as expected by neorealists, 
how might we explain attempts by Russia to bandwagon, from time to time, with the 
United States? How can neorealists explain Russia's behavior after the collapse of the 
USSR or after the events of 9/11 ? As Schweller, a realist, points out, such bandwagoning 
is inconsistent with the expectations of structural realism, which predicts balancing, not 
115 Pillsbury Michael, China Debates the Future Security Environment, National Defense University Press, 
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bandwagoning. 117 An explanation, however, can be attempted. From the standpoint of 
neorealism, the conciliatory and accommodationist nature of Gorbachev's policy may 
also be understood as being caused by growing Soviet economic and political weakness 
at home, and which made imperatives of ending the Cold War, limiting the costly arms 
race and opening the c10sed Soviet economy. Thus, for example, Wholforth-drawing on 
Gilpin's "power transition" theory-has argued that Gorbachev's highly concessionary 
and accommodationist diplomacy, with regards to arms control, democratic change in 
Eastern Europe and German reunification, represented a form of retrenchment 
characteristic of major powers experiencing economic CnslS as a result of imperial 
overburden. Soviet diplomacy in the period 1985-1991 was consistent with realist theory, 
c1aim Wholforth and other defenders of Realism. 118 Schweller attempts an explanation: 
"The aim of balancing is self-preservation and the protection of values already possessed, 
while the goal of bandwagoning is usually self-extension: to obtain values coveted. 
Slmply put, balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the 
opportunity for gain.,,119 This shows that Russia's actions are not incompatible with its 
main objective: maintaining its influence and interests in the international arena. The 
same can be said of Russia's behavior after 9/11. It may be that Russia viewed the post­
9/11 predicament of the United States as a strategic situation in which the Russians could 
play a part to gain access to information and funds: Russia's prior experience with 
terrorism, notably in Chechnya, may be cited as the main reason behind this support, but 
this is derivative of a short-term interest in combating terrorism in Eurasia. Nonetheless, 
117 Schweller, Randell L. "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back ln", International 
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for Russia, its standing increased in the international system after 9/11. By siding 
temporarily with the US, Russia could win concessions, including debt relief, exercise 
greater influence over the evolving mission of NATO, and demand that limits be imposed 
on its expansion. In that way, 9/11 can be seen to have provided Russia with an 
opportunity to augment its power and security. This view was well expressed by Foreign 
Minister Ivanov, who stated, "there have been no concessions (... ] we have been guided 
by our national interests.,,120 Ultimately, Putin viewed cooperation as the best means to 
promote Russian security, prestige and interests. Besides prestige, Putin was also 
concerned about Islamic terrorists, which pose a security concern for Russia. This is not 
just related to the current situation in Chechnya, but to the geographical proximity to 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and other fonner Soviet states in Central Asia. Putin himself said, 
in 2001: "1 am pursuing this policy (working with the United States after 9/11] solely 
because 1 believe this is fully consistent with Russia's national interests, not in order to 
win someone's favor.,,121 In 2003, Putin went to Kyrgyzstan to open a new military base, 
the first Russian military installation in a foreign country since the fall of the USSR, and, 
interestingly, just a few blocks from where American bases are located. 122 Putin's 
intentions were clear: to remind the United States and NATO that their relationship is 
only pragmatic. 
Establishing a multipolar balance is not the only strategy that is logically 
compatible with neorealist assumptions of anarchy and self-help. For example, Randall 
Schweller points out that states may adopt policies of peaceful accommodation, which 
120 Ambrosio, op.cit, p141 
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are perfectly "consistent with and widely discussed in the structural realist literature.,,123 
States weigh options and make decisions based primarily on an assessment of the 
external environment and the strategie situation. Waltz did not exclude the possibility that 
states might bandwagon from time ta time. Although he states that it is a rare 
phenomenon. Waltz concludes that states will use various strategies to ensure their 
survival and do whatever it takes to survive. 124 
The post-9/11 international climate is a perfect example of the so called "zero 
sum game" wherein each party is only concerned with its own relative power. Thus, the 
actions of the United States and Russia will only be regarded as being enacted to seek 
potential gains and as concentrating on how each potential gain by their "adversary" 
represents a relative loss for themselves. The pragmatic relationship between Russia and 
the United States may be guided by strategie considerations on both sides, particularly in 
Russia's case given that it could not afford to. Russia could use the 9/11 incident to its 
advantage and gain greater recognition in the international arena. According to Dov 
Lynch, professor and lecturer on Russian politics, President Putin's main policy towards 
the West was described as "not to becorne a member of the Euro-Atlantic community or 
ta merge Russia with it, but simply to align Russia with the most powerful group of states 
in international affairs.,,125 If Lynch is correct, this is a case of pragmatism, in which 
Putin is bandwagoning with the great powers to gain influence. Putin must adapt his 
foreign policy according to time and alter it to best serve Russia's ambition to maintain 
and regain power in the international system. As stated by Sergei Ivanov, defense 
123Schweller, Randell L "Domestic Structures and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacifie?" World 
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minister of the Russian Federation from 2001-2007, "for contemporary Russia it is 
important, perhaps even more than previously, to remain In the centre of world 
politics.,,126 Russia wants to avoid being isolated and wants to ensure a l'ole for itself in 
the international security of Asia, and most especially, Europe. 
An increased American presence in Central Asia after 9/11 did not undermine the 
influence of Russia in the region at least, not in all regions. Indeed, the Alliance of North, 
formed and controlled by Tadjiks, holds the key ministries and constitutes the dominant 
part of the Afghan government, which raises the international profile ofTajikistan, one of 
Russia's main allies in the area. This increase in the geopolitical importance ofTajikistan 
represents a reversai for Uzbekistan, which asserts greater independence from Moscow 
and does not hide its will to increase its sphere of influence in Central Asia. However, it 
is also important to note that, in spite of the fact that the American military presence in its 
country consolidated Karimov in its will of independence vis-a-vis Russia, Uzbekistan 
127
announced ail the same in 2002 its withdrawal of the GUUAM. So Russia still 
remains an important actor even after the events of 9111. But Russia could still have more 
influence, and that influence will not come with NATO expansion 
If we accept the neorealist reasoning that Russia is only "bandwagoning" with the 
US to achieve its own goal and interests, then we can also understand Russia's efforts 
with respect to NATO and the Partnership for Peace program (PŒ), the 1997 Founding 
Act, and the Permanent Joint Council (PJP). The ultimate goals for such rapprochement 
126 Dov Lynch, "Russia Faces Europe", Chaillot papers no. 60, [nstitute for Security Studies, European
 
Union May 2003, p 12.
 
127This organization was founded by its member states (initially composed ofGeorgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
 
and Moldova) on October 10lh 1997 to help reinforce the independence and sovereignty of past Soviet
 
republic states. Uzbekistanjoined in 1999.
 
61 
is to ultimately realize a greater voice for Russia in the international community, to have 
a say in security operations, and ideally, to hold a veto within NATO. As analyst 
Vladislav Surkov notes, Russia describes itself as "a most influential European 
nation.,,128 Thus, seen through the neorealist lens, Russia's behavior is perfectly 
understandable and logical. 
Finally, neorealists are hesitant to estimate the extent to which nations concern 
themselves with their long-term or short-term geopolitical position relative to other 
countries. Do nations favor the promotion of short-term gains at the expense of their 
long-term interests, or will they accept short-term sacrifices in pursuit of their long-term 
interests? In this case, to explain Russia's actions, Wahz wou Id to argue that simply to 
balance power in the short-run, Russia should be willing to arm its short-term allies Iran, 
China, and India (since, to neorealists, aIl alliances are temporary) and risk the long-term 
consequences. This is especially hue given neorealists track record of arguing the 
opposite position: that short-term gains should not be pursued at the expense of 10ng-term 
goals. For example, noted structural realist John Mearsheimer recently fretted that the 
United States is eroding its long-term relationship with China by "cozying up" to that 
country while ignoring Chinais graduaI rise relative to itself and other major powers. 
Mearsheimer argues that the United States should sacrifice dividends-such as economic 
benefits and deterrence of war in the short-term-that continuing "engagement" with 
China makes possible in order to shore up its moral position over the long-term. If it does 
128 Quoted in: Okara Andrei. "Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or a PR Project?" Russia in 
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not make sense to Mearsheimer that the United States should sacrifice its long-term 
position for short-term gains, it should make even less sense to him that Russia seek 
much more ephemeral short-term gains from arms trading at the expense of not merely 
"engaging" but arming astate that many fear could become a regional, if not global 
threat. 129 
Mearsheimer makes a convincing case, especially if we look at how Russia has 
aided China in developing blue water naval capabilities. Russia is putting itself in a very 
precarious situation as its strategie interests in the Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea 
could potentially be jeopardized. In fact, conflict between Russia and China is also 
possible in Central Asia, given the clear differences in the two countries' economic and 
political interests in that particular region. Aside from control of the region's energy 
supplies, water has become a potential source of conflict, especially given China's 
shortages. On the other hand, for India, this can be interpreted as China's intrusive naval 
presence in South Asian waters. 130 And since relations between India and China are 
rather shaky, Russia should be careful. How, therefore, can India trust its relationship 
with Russia when its supposed ally is helping its enemy? 
India's nuclear armaments are also cause for concern. As stated by Vladimir 
Baranovosky, "India's ascendance to the status of a dec1ared nuc1ear weapon power has 
produced mixed feelings in Russia[ ... ] However, the very fact of India going 'nuclear 
may be seen by Russia as devaluing its own nuclear arsenal which is almost the sole 
remaining symbol of its great power status and an important bargaining chip in the 
129 Toft Peter, "Jonh j. Mearsheimer :An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power", institute for 
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international arena." 131 Thus the crucial question remains: why provide assistance to Iran 
in the form of teclmology transfers, or help India and China, which are geographically 
close to Russia, when these states constitute serious threats to Russia's National Security? 
Waltz might retort that with Russia's shaky economy, sales to China, India, and 
Iran might very weB aid its military by improving its weapons teclmology. From this 
perspective, arms sales would indeed add to its long-term security, especially if Russia 
invests in producing and improving its weapon's technology. The extent to which short­
term economic motivations have prevailed over security concerns is evident in this 
conclusion, drawn by a respected study of the issue: "Chinese purchases have proved so 
important to the cash-starved defense industry, especially in the Russian Far East, that 
officiais representing these sectors have managed to override concerns within the military 
regarding the possibility of a long-term threat from a resurgent China." 132 The same can 
be said of India and Iran. Furthermore, helping potential nuclear powers or simply aiding 
fellow nuclear powers does not necessarily endanger Russia. The real question then 
would be what does Iran, China, or India has to gain from "nuking" Russia? Russia's vast 
territory can be appealing, especially for China's growing population. Russia's 
abundance of natural resources can also be an incentive. However, the cost of invading 
Russia is still very high. For India and China, Russia is their source of natural resources 
(most notably, oil and gas, but also timber, iron, and gold, to only name a few) and this is 
obtained within the framework of economic trade rather than invasion. In addition, any 
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hostile action from their part would run the risk of destroying future oil lines, which are 
valuable assets. This would also risk a potential war, not even to mention the health 
hazards that such a blast might pose to Russia's neighbors and beyond. Thus, one can 
argue that Russia's security is not in peril by trading such sensitive materials. Although a 
neorealist Interpretation of short-term gains make sense, this could potentially become a 
very dangerous game for Russia if its calculations are incorrect. Nonetheless, as 
neorealists would point out, a state will do what it must to survive. Overall, it is clear that 
neorealism offers both an interesting analysis of Russia's actions with regards to NATO 
and other valuable insights. 
4.2 Russia 's behavior: the constructivist perspective 
How can constructivism offer an alternative understanding of Russian behavior in 
balancing American power? More specifically, how can it explain Russia's alliances? 
Stephen Walt suggests that we consider a "balance of threat" analysis. The balance of 
threat concept demonstrates how close the starting points of neorealist and constructivist 
theories are. lndeed, as Petr Kratochvil notes, the questions raised by Walt are essentially 
identical to those posed by constructivist scholars. Kratochvil points out that the 
similarity is so salient that several authors have confused with the "constructivist 
features" of the work of Walt. l33 The difference is that constructivists [ocus on the raie 
that identity plays in shaping the particular character of situation, described through a 
balance of threat analysis. There is a danger that the enemy might destabilize the 
equilibrium of one's own identity. Thus, as Kratochvil explains, balancing a threat is only 
133 Kratchvil Petr, "The Balance of Threat Reconsidered: Construction of Threat in Contemporary Russia". 
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a natural reaction of the self, whose primary end is self-preservation. 134 To understand 
where this threat comes from, one would need to look at past experiences with similar 
threats. We needn't go very far to understand how Russia came to perceive NATO or the 
US as threatening to its self image. The perceived importance is clearly dependent on the 
position of the specifie identity raies that the US and Russia played during the Cold War. 
Russia is still maintaining that dynamic, therefore, any step which casts doubts on 
Russia's self-image as a great power will be interpreted as an attack on Russia's national 
character. Thus, it must be expected that the expansion of NATO, despite Russian 
objections, would be viewed as a denial of Russia's status in the international arena by 
the U.S. If the U.S. were not denying that Russia retained considerable power, the US 
would not even dare or consider such expansion. 
Neorealist concepts of balancing and bandwagoning, associated with the balance 
of power theories, can now be understood in constructivist terms. This means that one 
will not consider the ratio of military power, or other material capabilities, as the starting 
point of analysis, as advocated by the neorealists, but focus instead on the subjective and 
intersubjective perceptions of the self and the other. 135 Furthermore, constructivists will 
be inclined not to deal with the actors as utility maximizers, but rather to presume that 
they will act according to the "logic of apprapriateness". Thus, as Kratchvil reiterates, the 
self does not defend its raie identity vis a vis the other because of the calculated 
profitability of such behavior, such as economic or military gains, but because it 
considers the l'ole it enacts to be a part of the self. 136 This brings a new interpretation to 
Russia's conduct vis a vis NATO, in contrast to neorealism. ln this case, balancing would 
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be equivalent to fighting in socio-psychological terms because it translates into the 
refusai to accept the raie relationship offered by the other. 137 Russia will thus balance the 
U.S. 's destabilizing attack on the self by trying to asse11 its own role identity. To prevent 
a change in a favorable role identity, the self may even adopt a more aggressive position 
and may even physically attack the other to persuade it to acknowledge the role identity 
preferred by the self. 138 Russia's alliances might weil be interpreted in this light. Iran, 
China, and India would, according to constructivism, behave in the same manner as 
Russia, allying to defend its identity. 
Furthermore, constructivist theory is able to explain Russia's changing foreign 
policy smce the Cold War. Unlike neorealists, who keep trying to find loophole to 
explain the changing behavior of its significant other, such as bandwagoning, 
constructivists concentrate on elite's behavior and how it shapes the opinion of the 
population and how it affects Russia's foreign policy. The five schools of thoughts, 
mentioned in chapter I, provide a perfect example. An identity can change depending on 
the political environment and depending on who is in power. Neorealists can always 
argue that among these five school of thoughts, there is still a predominant view; a fear of 
the United States and NATO. The Statists, National Communisls, and Expansionisls ail 
believe that Russia remains a great power and should be careful with its dealings with the 
West, NATO, and make sure that Russia maintains a balance of power. To a certain 
extent, one might argue that although the National Democrats concentrate more on the 
importance of cultural factors and believes in impraving existing institutions such as 
NATO, the National Democrats are still not advocating for integration with NATO. On 
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the contrary, they remam still skeptical about US intentions and believe that Russia 
should "exercise caution and creativity in the process of adjustment, by learning from the 
world and by bringing in its own cultural experience.,,139 However, as mentioned 
previously, neorealists would need to find an explanation for the last school of thought: 
Westernizers. The Westernizers school of though is shared among politicians such as 
Yegor Gaida, Andrei Kozyrev, Mikhail Kasyanov, Irina Khakamada, Anatoly Chubais, to 
name a few. They believe that the West is basically Russia's only hope of salvation, and 
that it needs to incorporate itself in Western institutions, including NATO, to overcome 
its social and political backwardness. Until neorealists can come up with an answer, the 
constructivist interpretation seems to be the best analysis in explaining elite's attitudes. 
4.3 The raIe ofinternaI variables 
Typically neorealists do not include internai variables in their analysis, but it 
would be unfair to completely dismiss Putin's role and how the Russian population views 
him. That is where the utility of constructivism cornes in handy. How can we dismiss the 
raie of Putin from our equation? Would another leader make the same decisions as Putin? 
If the population would not support its leader, even if the system is not a democratic 
regime and regardless of electoral fraud, can the president act in the same matter? In this 
short section, we will compare the current structure of the international system with that 
which was in place during Yeltsin's presidency. Although both presidents faced different 
economic situations, the structure of the international system was not that different, in 
fact, it was still at the hands of the United States. It is argued by many scholars that 
Yeltsin had a rather different approach than Putin. However, we will argue that Yeltsin 's 
decisions bore similar results to what Putin has done. We will demonstrate that even 
139 Tsygankov, op.cit p 54 
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though Putin and Yeltsin are two different presidents, both of their actions can be 
interpreted in both neorealist and constructivist terms, and that would thus prove that the 
use of internai variables in this particular case study is not necessary irrelevant as the 
neorealists would argue. Both leaders viewed the predicament of the international system 
as the same, and thus both leaders tried their best to counteract the hegemony of the 
United States and ultimately its control on NATO, but maybe for two different reasons. 
The structure of the international system under Yeltsin is similar to that of today. 
NATO, under Yeltsin was expanding, as it was undel' Putin, and the United States is still 
the hegemonic power that holds the reigns of NATO. This was seen under Yeltsin's 
objections to NATO airstrikes in Yugoslavia, a sovereign state, by ignoring the role of 
the United Nations. And it is also seen today when America acts on its own premises in 
Iraq. During these years, Boris Yeltsin and, like Putin who followed in his footsteps, was 
against NATO expansion and still wanted a say in the organization. Yeltsin hoped that 
eventually Russia might become ready to join "the political part of NATO," and "then at 
least we shall not be kept apart from the issues which ail European countries will be 
discussing if they ail suddenly become members of NATO." 140 President Yeltsin spoke 
only for eventual inclusion on the political side and structures of the alliance, not the 
military structures. Neorealists might apply the same logic that was used during the 
tragedy of 9/11 in analyzing Putin's reaction. Yeltsin is bandwagoning with the great 
powers to gain greater influence. Yeltsin needed to adapt his foreign policy according to 
time and alter it to best serve Russia's ambition to maintain and eventually regain power 
in the international system. 
140 Quoted in Straus L Ira, "Introduction: The Evolution of the Discussion on NATO-Russia Relations", 
Russia and NATO, The George Washington University, February 1997, p4. AvaiJable at 
http://www.fas.org/man/nato/ceern/introduction.htm 
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Although Yeltsin's action can be construed in neorealist terms, one can argue that 
the constructivists are cOlTect; in asserting that a leader's action might also be guided by 
the fear of loosing its own self or identity. One can argue that Yeltsin was trying to get 
the best bargain possible from NATO by including Russia in the organization. One can 
also argue that although Yeltsin was opposed to NATO as a military organization, the 
president was slowly trying to redefine a "new" Russian identity. Russia was mourning 
the loss of it's past glory and prestige in the international arena, and was now struggling 
both domestically and intemationally to define itself again. 
Yeltsin also gave great importance to its relationship with China and both 
countries found common cause in their opposition of US hegemony. Both countries had a 
good partnership (constructive pm1nership 1994 and the strategie partnership in 1996) 
was continued by Putin. The same can be said of both Iran and India. In fact, it was under 
Yeltsin's presidency where a triangular strategic relationship involving Russia, China and 
India was enunciated. From a strategie stand point, Russia was not strong enough to 
challenge the power of the United States. Especially after Yeltsin's failure to get any real 
say in NATO and after the way the United States behaved towards Russia, China and 
India were the only countries that are large enough players to be potential partners in a 
strategic balancing act against the rising hegemon. This "troika" could thus potentially 
outweigh US hegemony. By "also going East" and building counterbalancing alliances 
with China, India, Iraq, Iran and Belarus, Yeltsin's decisions could be viewed in 
neorealist terms: limit the balance of power and thereby outweigh American influence 
and increase Russia's influence in other spheres; such as Russia's post-Soviet territory, 
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and Russia' s influence in Eurasia and thought to gain significant investments from the 
United States. 141 
The constructivists would argue that Yeltsin's search for "alliances" was guided 
by Yeltsin's rejection from NATO and the fear of exclusion in international affairs. The 
fear of loosing its own identity and pUl-pose in the world pushed Yeltsin in another 
direction. 
4.4 The importance ofdiscourse 
The president must be able to share his Vlews with its population, and more 
importantly, the population must acknowledge this identity. To this end, Russian leaders 
spend a fair amount of time reassuring Russians about the greatness and importance of 
their country. For instance, the government's official foreign policy strategy, announced 
June 28, 2000, refers to the Russian Federation as lia great power ... one of the most 
influential centers of the modern world ... [with a] responsibility for maintaining security 
in the world both on a global and on a regional level." 142 Such preening is hard to 
imagine from, say, Germany or Japan, both countries that learned the hard way of the 
dangers of relying on military might; of course, at roughly the same time, at their hands, 
Russia learned the danger of not possessing military might. 143 
Putin's popularity in Russia, in part a result of presenting a tough image, is such 
that supportive groups have called for a referendum to be held to allow him to l'un for the 
presidency again. 144 As Putin himself once expressed, "Russia will either be a great 
141 David Charles Philippe, Jacques Levesque, Ed, The Future of NATO: Enlargement, Russia, and 
European Security, Centre For Security and Foreign PoJicy Study, London:2000,p 174 
142Legvold Robert, "Russia's Unformed Foreign Policy", Foreign AjJairs, Vol. 80, No.S, 
September/October 200 l , P 1 
143 With reference to the aftermath of WWII 
144 The insider's guide to Vladimir Putin (October 26, 2006), online: 
bu!);.! 'W\\\\.Cl1n.com J2006,'W JRLD,europe'! (),OS!imider.pulill index.htl11 1 
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power or she will not exist at all.,,145 Putin's inaugural speech in 2000 triggered another 
round of debate over Russian identity. In his speech in the Kremlin, President Vladimir 
Putin said he was certain that Russia faced a "shining future" as "a great and flourishing 
power," and said, "We can always be proud of our country, with its great history, its 
contribution to world culture, and its achievements in science and education." 146 Putin's 
speech focused on Russia's international standing, with specifie mention of education, 
science, and culture, and general references to Russia's history. Putin discussed the Post-
Soviet transition of the 1990s as a difficult test, from which Russia had emerged as a 
new, modern country. "Here, in the Kremlin, is the nexus of our national memory. Here, 
in the Kremlin, the history of our land has been decided over the centuries. And we have 
no right to be "Ivans denying our roots." [ ... ] We must know our history, know it as it is. 
We must learn its lessons and always remember those who built the State of Russia, who 
upheld its dignity and who made it great, strong and powerful. We will carry on this 
memory, and we will preserve this continuity. And we will pass on to our successors 
everything the best of our history, everything the best.,,147 Clearly, Putin offers Russians a 
vision of the motherland as a great power and a source of pride. 
Putin's vision of Russia can easily be construed in constructivist terms; thus by 
focusing on the importance of identity, the raIe of socialization in society, and the raIe of 
elites and how they each define the state. State officiais are indispensable when it comes 
to examining state security discourse: "The representations created by state officiais 
145 "A Gladiator's Victory", Segodnva, March 27'h 2001, P1,4, reproduced in What the Papers Say, March 
27'h 2001 
146 Rutland Peter, "Russian National Identity: Still a \York in Progress", Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 2, 
Issue 117, June 16'h 2005, pl 
147 Press release of the Press Service of the President of the Russian Federation, Kremlin, Moscow, (May 
71\ 2000) online at Illtp:f/www.russiaoèmbassy.oi"!!./RSSIA/Speech-prcsidcm.htm 
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make clear both to those officiais themselves and to others who and what 'we' are, who 
and what 'our enemies' are, in what ways 'we' are threatened by 'them', and how 'we' 
might best deal with those 'threats' .,,148 Stephen Walt, while comparing different IR 
theories, also found that "[i]nstead of taking the state for granted and assuming that it 
simply seeks to survive such is the claim of neorealists, constructivists regard the 
interests and identities of states as a highly malleable product of specifie historical 
processes... [and] pay close attention to the prevailing discourse(s) in society because 
discourse reflects and shapes beliefs and interests, and establishes accepted norms of 
behavior.,,149 
Although the constructivists are making a good claim, Putin's speeches' on the 
great status of Russia can also be seen as an index of power. As Wohlforth reiterates, a 
state's status can be used as a metric for power. Thus, how astate views itself compared 
to others in the international system is consistent with neorealist theory.150 In the words 
of Wohlforth neorealists "wouId portray status-seeking as endogenous to insecurity.,,151 
From this perspective, we can understand Russia's behavior. NATO under the 
"supervision" of the US is creeping in Russia's backyard. Russia is threatened and thus 
will look for reassurance of its rank in the system. The United States is less worried about 
its status and security because it is the current hegemon. It is thus only natural that Russia 
feels more threatened faced with ail these security challenges. 
148 Weldes Jutta, op.cit, p. 283. 
149 Walt M. Stephen, "International Relations: One WorId, Many Theories", Foreign Policy, Spring 
1998,pp.40 
150 Wohlforth, op.cit, p 234 
151 Ibid 
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4.5 Role ofpopulation 
For Russian leaders to implement the vIsion informing such an identity, the 
population must support il. Although Russia cannot be considered a democratic state, it 
would be wrong to dismiss the conelation between the political capital of the leadership 
and their popularity with the population, even if elections are fixed or otherwise 
determined in advance. Democratie states share an important identity relationship with 
the voters. Voters often identify with the values and ideas espoused by particular 
candidates, and although there may not be an exact correlation, the winners of electoral 
poil are often those with whom the majority of the population most ciosely identifies. In 
the Russian case, President Putin was the candidate best able to communicate a new 
identity to the populace and to capture their support. Whether or not Putin's electoral 
victories were fraudulous, his popularity among Russian voters is undeniable. Poils 
conducted in Russia in 2000 show that 78% of Russians insisted that Russia must be a 
great power. 152 This desire manifests itself in a variety of ways. Asked in 1999 to list the 
ten greatest men of ail times, respondents named nine Russians- the only foreigner was 
Napoleon, presumably because he was defeated on Russian sail. The most commonly 
listed five people were Peter the Great, Lenin, PusW<in, Stalin, and the astronaut Iurii 
Gagarin. Apart from PusW<in, these historical figures have in common their success in 
making Russia a power to be reckoned with on land and in space. 153 When asked why 
they admired Stalin, people answered, "He raised the country.,,154 Clearly, the Russian 
population is deeply invested in believing their country is a great power. 
152Pipes Richard, "Flight From Freedom: What Russians Think and Want", Foreign Affairs, May/June 
2004, p. 2. 
153 Ibid, p.3 
154 Ibid. 
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Much of the nostalgia for the Soviet Union derives from the belief that its might 
made Russia a great power on the world stage-a status it has since lost. When asked, in 
1999, how they would like their country to be perceived by other nations, 48% of 
Russians said "mighty, unbeatable, indestructible, a great world power." Only 22% 
wanted Russia to be seen as "affluent and tlu'iving", 6% as "educated, civilized, and 
cultured", 3% as "peace-loving and friendly", and a mere 1% as "law-abiding and 
democratic.,,155 Although the Russian population shares the views of its president 
regarding the cauntry's status, do they also acknowledge the threat perceived by its 
president regarding NATO? A 1997 Russian poil asked reasonably well-informed 
respondents how they felt about NATO's expansion: 38% responded that the nature of 
NATO was aggressive. In 200 1, the same question was asked and 50% replied it was of 
an aggressive nature cornpared to 58% in 2004. 156 lt seems that Russian attitudes towards 
NATO have not improved over the years, 
Russian popular opinion remained fairly constant under Putin. ln 2003, Russians 
still ascribed great importance to its identity, with 46% saying that they would like their 
country to be cansidered as a great powerful country and 86% responding that how 
Russia was perceived by the l'est of the world was important. 157 Looking at the 2004 
presidential elections, Leon Aron argues that Putin won because he was able to "embody 
and symbolize ta millions of Russians a still very precarious balance between freedom 
and order, and between the old and the new.,,158 Putin was building on the idea of a 
155 Ibid 
156 Braun, op.cit, p33 
13 111 157 Russia's image in the world: Public Opinion foundation Database, November 2003, online : 
I1I\p:Jbcl.english.fom.ru/report'mal .projec!S'dominanLJ dominant/D03/Sl') 9,,+1[ 253 113/4188. 1Il) c 0345 
12 
158 Quoted in: Godzimirski M. Jakub, "Putin and Post-Soviet ldentity: Building Blocks and Buzz Words", 
Problems ofPost Communism, September/October 2008, Vo1.55, No 5, P 23 
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strang state that plays an important raie in the international system. In 2006, 41 % of 
Russians considered NATü to be an organization that mainly supports and promotes U.S 
interests. 159 Thus, instead of considering a neorealist approach that ignores the 
importance of domestic variables in explaining how astate should behave, one might 
look at the constructivist approach and argue that Putin's popularity with voters is due to 
his ability to articulate what the population wants and to articulate and implement 
policies that appeal to the public. 
One can conclude from these surveys that Russians feel their country should still 
play the l'ole of a great power, even if its economic and military capabilities are not on a 
par with those of the United States. We can note a correlation between the relationship of 
Russia's population and the influence by its leader and how its leader perceives the 
country's identity. 
Now that we have drawn out sorne of the ways that Russia views itself, one also 
needs to examine more closely how NATO, since its birth in 1949, became the 
"significant other" and how it is perceived as a threat to Russian identity. According to 
constructivists, states have no inherent international raies. Instead, they acquire 
understandings about their roles and their positions through "collective meanings".160 
These are constructed among states in relation to one another. By extension, a state's raie 
resides in a particular context. In other words, how states understand themselves depends 
161
on the way they fit into a broader set of interactions with other states. If states interact 
159 Russians About NATO:60 Years Serving The Interests Of The U.S In Europe: Russian Public Opinion 
Research Center, V ciom Press Release # 1161, online: httpJ\"ci( I11,COll1lneWS/, l'css-rel 'a.s<.:s/prc:ss­
rdease'sillh\1ei 11670 .hlmf 
160 Wendt Alexander, "Anarchy is what states make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", 
International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, p397 
161 Hopf, op.cit, p175 
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III consistent patterns, their relationships form the basis of the system's norms and 
expectations. These norms and expectations in tum affect the way states define their 
l'oies. State roles are thus not autonomous. 
If the constructivist approach is correct and identities are flexible, how can we 
explain Russia's view of itself as a great power? Neorealists argue that Russia's 
ambitions will be similar to those during the Cold War, save for its current military and 
economic predicament, but those ambitions may again firm up. If Russia retains the 
desire to be a great power, how can constructivists argue that Russia's identity has 
changed? Russia is currently engaging with Iran and China, and challenging the United 
States for the attention of India, so it seems that Russia has not changed. Constructivists 
will answer that appearances can be deceiving and misleading. Russia stiJl aspires to be a 
great power, but the definition of a great power has change significantly since the Cold 
War. During the CoId War, Russia was the United States' the only competitor for global 
hegemony, and its ultimate purpose was to win the CoId War battle for supremacy. 
Although Russia stiJl displays animosity towards the U.S, Russia is DOW trying to achieve 
the status quo and be part of a multilateral system - not a system dominated by a single 
country ... especially the U.S. One might question Russia's current search for "alliances", 
but that search reflects its recent change in role and identity. Russia stiJl aims to be a 
great force in the international system, but in terms that differ from its Cold War 
ambitions. Russia is not trying to become an alternative to the West, but to be an 
influential part of il. This does not mean that Russia wants to take part in all Western 
institutions, but it does want to have a significant say in important decisions. 
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From a constructivist perspective, Russia wants NATO - which it sees as atoll 
and extension of the United States - to cease its expansion and infringement on Russia's 
sphere of influence and identity. Russia's identity is still contested and a great part of its 
identity is still intertwined with the "old empire" mentality. Thus, NATO expansion 
menaces its still fragile identity. David Campbell describes it best, writing that security 
issues have become a way to mark "the ethical boundaries of identity rather than the 
territorial borders of the state.,,162 So, NATO's advancement is not just a question of 
encroaching on its sphere of influence, but rather of protecting a part of its identity. 
4.6 Russian National Security Concept and the Foreign Policy Concept 
To understand a state one needs to examine its connections with other states and 
the common agreements that result to form an international community. Realists assume 
that the anarchic character of the international system is an objective reality that 
profoundly shapes the behavior of states. In order to better understand Russia's 
relationship with the US and NATO it is useful to look at major Russian foreign policy 
documents, such as the National Security Concept or the Foreign Policy Concept, which 
reveals the official and most influential discourses. 163 These texts are important because 
they shed light on principle state opinions on important questions related to the state's 
main objectives and reflect the ideas and policies of top executives and governmental 
officiais. By looking at these texts, we can identify who is Russia's foe and the 
importance Russia derives from il. 
It is clear from the documents, notably Russia's National Security Concept of 
1997 and 2000, that NATO is represented negatively: "The NATO expansion to the east 
162 Campbell David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised 
edition, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, J 998, p 156 
163 Kassianova, op.cit, p821-839 
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and its becoming a dominant military and political force in Europe,,164 This view is also 
shared in Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 2000, wherein Russia complains that the 
unipolar trend of the United States contains an "insufficient efficiency of multilateral 
mechanisms for maintaining peace", and complains as weil of the growing inability of 
Russia to check this trend. 165 
More importantly, both documents shed light on how Russia views itself. The 
state discourse incorporates the importance of Russia's great historical heritage "many 
centuries of history" and "rich cultural traditions.,,\66 These discourses reinforce the 
views of Russia' s role as a historically great power. Further references to this "status" are 
made every time Russia speaks of its important role in the United Nations or its 
membership in the 08. One can only conclude that the evolution of Russia's current state 
identity discourse has been shaped by its recent interactions with the United States. 
The official foreign policy concept approved by President Yeltsin in April 1993 
revealed the abandonment of the "liberal Westernizing" impulse. From the list of "vitally 
important interests" listed in the document, only the third pertained to the world outside 
the borders of the former USSR. In that section of the document, there is mention of the 
countries of Western Europe where it exclaimed that "integration without Russia could 
do serious damage to the Russian Federation's vital interests" 167. Interestingly this alludes 
to NATO without actually mentioning il. The document also refers to its relations with 
the United States. While Russia did not try to alienate its relationship with the US, but the 
164 Ibid, P 832.
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document did mention common interests and a certain will to develop cordial 
relationship, but also stressed that U.S.-Russian interests did not always concur, which 
criticized about the "discriminatory restrictions in the commercial, economic, scientific 
and teclmological spheres." 168 The combination of these remarks and that of "NATO" are 
clearly stipulated in between the lines of the document. Boris Yeltsin was clearly juggling 
Russian interests with a careful balancing strategy with the United States and NATO. 
The 1997 National Security Concept, cautioned against "attempts to create a 
structure of international relations based on unilateral solutions of the key problems of 
world politics".169 The document did not mention the United States, but it is clear from 
this formulation, that it targeted the US. 
What we observe in these three documents is the graduai change in Russian 
identity in its foreign policy, and in its place in the international system. After the CoId 
War, Russia tried to reach out to the West and incorporate itself on levels political, 
cultural, and within the security community. The 1993 Foreign Policy Concept is an 
attempt by Russia to include itself in the "Western community". Although Yeltsin's 
words might seem somewhat harsh, they denote the desire of Russia to be integrated and 
counted among the Western/European cornmunities. The change in tone can be viewed in 
National Security Concept of 1997 and 2000, where both documents express a different 
type of l'ole an identity of Russia. lt is clear that Western communities did not we1come 
Russia, and that Russia would continue to be viewed as separate. In response, Russian 
reverted again to its traditional self-conception as a great power. It is important to 
168 Ibid 
169 Light Margot, "In Search of an Identity: Russian Foreign Policy and the End of Ideology", Journal of 
Communis/ S/udies and Transi/ion Poli/ics, Frankcass & Company Ltd 2003, P 49 
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reiterate that the great power concept, for constructivists, is ail about the psychological 
profile of the state. No importance is placed on material and economical resources. Thus, 
Russia's self-perception as a great power need not be considered in materialist terms. 
Russia did not have the proper resources to compete with NATO and the United States 
after the Cold War, but that has not stopped Russia from considering itself to be such, nor 
to demand that be so recognized. 
Regardless of Russia' s change in tone in its foreign policy from 1993 to 2000, one 
can still perceive the slow transition of its identity. Although Russia still wants to be 
considered a great power, it also wants to be part of the Western community, something 
that was not even considered after the Cold War. Putin's Foreign Poliey Concept of2000 
reflects a change of attitude since Russia was "unable to reconcile itself to Washington's 
global leadership, Moscow promoted the vision of multipolarity,,170 which is stated in the 
document. Thus Russia's search for alliances, as mentioned in Chapter Three, can be 
viewed not only in neorealist terms, but also in constructivist terms. Russia still wants its 
place in the world and wants to play an important role. Since it cannot sustain its prior 
greatness as a superpower during the Cold War, Russia believes it can still be a great 
power (not that of a superpower) but in a multipolar world. 
A case in point would be Russia's behavior after the events of 9/11. This 
represented a great opportunity for Russia to demonstrate to the international community 
and to the United States that it could be accepted as an important Western ally in the fight 
against tenorism. More importantly, as Dmitri Trenin argues, Russia did not see this as 
170 Bobo La, Russian Foreign PoJicy in the post-Soviet Era: Reality, Illusion, and Mythmaking, New York: 
Palgrave, 2002, p12. 
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joining the American war on terror, but rather: "America was joining, belatedly, with 
Russia in the fight against a common enerny.,,171 That common enemy was terrorism. The 
event of 911, at least from the early outset, encouraged Russia to feel that it was still a 
great power and yet able to work in tandem with the West. This is an example of Russia's 
changing identities. 
How can one interpret Yeltsin's behavior from a neorealist perspective? Again, 
we don't need to look at the man that rules the country, but to look at its environment. As 
mentioned previously, the structure of the international system under Yeltsin was 
practically identical to that of the structure under Putin with one significant difference: 
the state of the Russian economy. As mentioned previously, Waltz suggests that in the 
presence of nuclear weapons, any challenge to a leading state, and any attempt to reverse 
a state's decline, has to rely on econornic means. J72 After the fall of the U.S.S.R, Russia 
was needed capital investment in order to reconstruct its falling economy. The "shock 
therapy" which began in 1992, led to severe poverty for millions of Russians. Not only 
did production decline, but promised American assistance was practically non- existent 
according to Russian authorities. This fact was also accepted by the population, has noted 
in the newspaper Pravda "we have been fed cock-and-bull stories about the inevitable 
'rain of gold' from the West to back up Yeltsin's reforms."I73 Russian polis conducted in 
1993 and 1995, reveal the Russian population's perception that the United States was 
'7lTrenin Dmitri: "Russia's foreign and security policy under Putin", Carnegie Moscow Center:Carnegie 
Indowment For International Peace, 2005, p6. Available: http://www.carnegie.ru/en/pubs/media/72804.htm 
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purposely weakening Russia. 174 Thus, if we account for the economic situation of Russia 
in our analysis, it is clear that Yeltsin must have acted according ta the country's best 
interests. In a hegemonic world guided by the United States, Russia needed to look at its 
options. Its economy was in disarray and the country's influence via the US (and NATO) 
was declining, so there were few options available to the president, but to try and 
stimulate the economy eventually build its military might, and thereby improve its 
influence in the international arena. According to these documents, we cannot say that 
Yeltsin gave his "country" to the US, but rather tried to balance its strategic interests as 
best as he could. It would have been politically, economically, and militarily suicidai to 
declare the US as an enemy. Russia would then loose its diminishing credibility and 
influence, and would become isolated losing economic investments, especially from the 
United States, even if its contribution was only minimal. Confronted with this dilemma, 
Yeltsin had no choice but to collaborate with the United States. 
4.7 Critiques ofthe constructivist explanation 
Of course, like neorealism, the constructivist approach is not immune to criticism. 
ln fact, the first critique would come from a neorealist who would complain that the 
existing deployments of arms may make it too dangerous for astate to take the fi rst step 
in initiating cooperation. This of course, ail depends on the motives of states. If the 
motives are defensive, as at the end of the Cold War, these may be viewed as peaceful 
intentions. But if the motive of the other state is perceived to be greed, it may elicit the 
opposite reaction. Instead of cooperating, one might instead become more aggressive, 
'74Hough Jeffrey F., Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985-1991 (Washington: The 
Brookings Institution, J997), p. 519 
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especially if the state's motives are unclear. If motives are unclear, then cooperation 
might be a risky move. NATO's expansion into Russia's sphere of influence can be 
viewed in this light. Thus, this conclusion does not support the constructivist view, which 
holds that states can change intersubjective understandings by changing their behavior. 
Material factors, such as weapons, may indeed have Inherent significance. In the 
face of mistrust, a neorealist would argue, existing weapons constrain cooperative 
gestures either because they support a stable balance that may be dangerous to disturb or 
because they represent the capability of a newly confident adversary to convert from 
passive defense into active offence. By focusing on understanding instead of force, 
constructivists may be too optimistic about the possibilities of changing behavior. Such 
change, a neorealist would caution, depends also on motives and material constraints. 
The second criticism is the problem of the definition of the terms. What is meant 
by 'intersubjective understanding' and how can it be measured? It requires both empirical 
observation (what states do) and Interpretation (what states seems to construct after 
observing each other's actions). The problem is that the two are not interchangeable. 
Empirical and subjective analyses produce different kinds of results. They cannot be 
merged. What about the notion of identity and the other? The difficulty of defining the 
words themselves is a challenge and to understand the interaction between the self and 
the other can, at times, be confusing, especially since there seems to be as many identities 
as there are others. This is explained weil by Hogg and White, where they note that the 
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self is multiple, and that the self IS perceived as "differentiated into multiple 
identities." 175 
For example, different schools of thought within Russia (example: statist vs 
westernizing) have different visions of the world that lead to differently aI1icuiated 
identities. But this is further complicated by the fact that you also have a Russian identity 
that is ascribed to by the state, and an ethnic identity which is claimed by a population 
that does not necessarily reside in Russia proper. Not ail Russian-speaking minorities in 
the post-Soviet republics consider themselves Russians (for example a Russian might 
prefer his Ukrainian identity). The multiplicity of identity makes it a whole lot harder to 
dissect. Furthermore, even in Russia's main discourses and policy concepts, the United 
States are not inextricably intertwined with NATO. At times, the US may be viewed as 
the West (which would exclude NATO) and at others the West could simply refer to the 
EU. J76 Thus, different conceptions of identity and other have a strong impact on our 
understanding of the behavior of the self. 
Another criticism challenges the constructivist notion that state identities and 
interests are flexible and situational, and that selfishness can be transcended through 
convergent understandings. Jonathan Mercer, in his article Anarchy and Identity, gives an 
interesting criticism of the logic of constructivism. Self-interest, according to his 
criticism, is not an arbitrary neorealist assumption but rather is firmly fixed in human 
behavior in groups. This is still more the case for people in groups, for while individuals 
may set aside self-interest in the service of sorne other ends, the dynamics of group 
identity and that bonds between them are such that non-self-interested behavior is less 
175 Hogg Michael & al. "A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social 
ldentity Theory", Social Psychology Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 4, '995, P 255 
176 Kassianova, op. cit, p 821-839. 
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likely, not more, as the consent of ail IS required to act against the interests of the 
group. 177 
What's more, as people become members of a group, they increasingly identify 
with it, they develop loyalties to one another, and come to perceive common interests and 
distinguish their group from others. These views, drawn from social psychology and 
supported by behavioral economics, squarely challenge the constructivist's notion that 
interests can be transformed, paving the way from conflict to cooperation. Group 
solidarity is a powerful force. It is the reason "why strong in-groups are the most likely to 
have strong out groups; why ethnocentrism is ubiquitous; and why groups egoism, self­
help and relative gains are ever present in international politics.,,178 For Mercer, anarchy 
is not what states make of it, but is rather a consequence of inter-group relations in 
anarchy. One might reply that what is true for groups may not be so for states as they are 
substantially larger and structurally more diverse, but that case remains to be made. 
Another flaw of the constructivist theory is that it cannot explain Russia's 
cooperation with the U.S on 9/11, or can it? Neorealists argued that Russia's 
"bandwagoning" or cooperation with the United States after a terrorist attack on its soil 
was undertaken simply to benefit Russia's security and interests. Whereas the neorealist 
theory makes a convincing case, constructivist theory cannot explain Russia's behavior in 
this stance. According to the constructivist perspective, it is ail about protecting one's 
identity. How can a terrorist attack on the U.S be interpreted, as Walt's puts it, a "balance 
of threat"? This attack was not directed towards Russia, nor was it from the US, nor from 
NATO members. Therefore, how can we understand Russia's actions? We cannot argue 
J77 Mercer Jonathan, "Anarchy and Identity", International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), p 
251 
178 Ibid 
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that Russia shares the fundamental values of the United States (Western values)/ NATO 
or what the EU would term "a community of shared values" that would push Russia to 
act. 179 If Russia's identity is that of a great power, the only possible analysis is to 
interpret this situation as a neorealist would, unless we accept the constructivist fact that 
identities are flexible. If Russia's claimed identity is one of a great power, then the only 
explanation that can be offered from a constructivist standpoint, is that Russia's identity 
has changed after the events of 9111. This would indeed concord with another brand of 
constructivism, not espoused by Wendt since "Wendt's anthropomorphized 
understanding of the state continues to treat states, in typical realist fashion, as unitary 
actors with a single identity and a single set of interests.,,180 As previously mentioned, the 
critical constructivists do not perceive the identity of aState like a fact of the history, but 
rather as "un élément situé dans le flux du temps, toujours changeant, [bref comme] 
quelque chose d'impliqué dans un processus." 181 In this sense, critical constructivism has 
a different conception of identity in contrast to the structuralism of Wendt, which holds 
that identities can be reproduced in time, and are thus flexible and able to change and 
adapt to a new environment. With this conception, a new threat, terrorism, and not 
NATO/US, would reshape Russia's identity. 
Another problem with the constructivist interpretation arises from its explanation 
of "rapprochement" with NATü and the United States. As mentioned previously, 
Russia's effort towards NATO to join the Partnership for Peace program (PfP), the 1997 
Founding Act, and the Permanent Joint Council (PJP) was considered by neorealists as a 
179 Smith, op.cit, p 112 
180 Quoted in, Weldes Jutta, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999, p.9. 
181 Quoted in, Macleod Alex, Isabelle Masson & David Morin, « Identité nationale, sécurité et la théorie 
des relations internationales », Étude Internationales, vol.3S, nO.1 (mars 2004), p.18 
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strategie goal to gain more influence in the organization. Constructivists would argue 
however, that Russia is trying to rebuild its identity and that it is trying to slowly 
integrate itself with the West. But it is the West that is unwilling to give Russia a second 
chance. For example, Russian's argued that the PfP's "main force was made up primarily 
of the anti-Russia sentiments" and to "ensure a US military presence in Poland and 
Hungary.,,182 These sentiments still continue to this day. Constructivists would argue that 
the United States is not ready to accept the "new identity" espoused by Russia. 
Although constructivists argue that identities can be flexible and changeable, it is 
nevertheless a long stretch to actually believe such intentions coming from Russia. For 
admission to NATO, under Article 10 stipulates that "any other European state, in a 
position to further the princip les of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the 
North Atlantic area, may be invited to accede by unanimous agreement.,,183 Russia is not 
enumerated among the European nations, although this is not necessarily dependent on 
geographic location, especially if we look at Turkey's case. But more importantly, the 
principles on which North Atlantic Cooperation is founded on is noted in the preamble of 
the treaty which states that only states that uphold the principles of "democracy, 
individual liberty, and the rule of law" can have membership. Clearly, Russia does not 
respect any of those principles, nor is it even trying. 
As we can see, both approaches have their strengths and weaknesses. Although 
the neorealist approach seems to have the upper hand, one cannot disregard what 
constructivism brings to this analysis. 
182 Fawn Rick, Realignments in Russian Foreign Policy, London; Frankcass, 2003, p 62.
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Conclusion 
5.1 Alternative Solutions 
What are the alternative solutions? How can we establish trust and improve the 
relationship between Russia and NATO? As explored earlier in this paper, war is 
unlikely, but the situation could degenerate back into a Cold War. IfRussia is not granted 
NATO membership, what else can be done to alleviate Russia's fear of encirclement? 
Many authors have pondered this question, and it seems that ail solutions come back to 
the same conclusions. Russia must be granted the veto. But granting Russia veto power is 
a serious problem for the West and other NATO members. For starters, core members of 
NATO, especially the West and former Soviet states, still believe that Russia might build 
a wedge within NATO and that it would be too costly to help Russia's long borders. 
An interesting point has been made by Ira Straus. For him, the "veto problem" has 
been a serious impediment to the development of a full relationship between NATO and 
Russia. The problem lies not only in the fragile trust between both parties, but rather lies 
at NATO's core. The alliance fears that giving Russia the veto would weaken NATO 
consensus. As Straus clearly points out, NATO needs significant internai reforms. This 
has been constantly and systematically ignored even with the entry of new NATO 
members. 184 Since the raison d'être of NATO has changed, appropriate reforms should 
also be adjusted: "The feeling of a need for an external enemy to maintain internai 
cohesion is an indicator of an immature politY and an unstable condition, such as led 
Germany to make an enemy of the world; it is not a normal condition of a mature 
184 Straus Ira, "NATO: The Only West Russia Has?" Demokratizatsiya, Heldref Publications Spring 2003, 
p5 
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democratic society. The presence of this fear in NATO is a warning sign, indicating the 
persistence of elements of immaturity in the NATO "society" that the west will have to 
overcome.,,185 NATO needs to change its decision making process to maybe non-
consensus procedures or install any type of mechanism where ail parties concerned can 
approve of. 
Besides ratifying or changing NATO's decision-making process, Andrei 
Piontkovski, director of the Center for Strategic Research in Moscow, suggests that 
Russia needs to forget about NATO and concentrate instead on building stronger 
alliances with the US and Britain especially regarding security issues. These two 
countries were Russian allies during both World Wars and share similar political and 
economic interests and are fully capable of defending Russia against their common 
threat: terrorism, the Islamists threat and the plausible danger that China might cause in 
the future. 186 The flaw in this argument is that although it might be fruitful for ail parties 
concerned to im praye their relationshi p, certain problems will sti Il need to be add ressed 
through NATO. Russia would still be encircled by NATO members, and Britain and the 
US would stiJl have to cooperate within NATO parameters to address security concerns 
anyway because of the proximity of Russia to its fellow NATO members. Britain and the 
US will find it difficult to act on the behalf of Russia while excluding the security 
concerns and opinions of other members of the alliance. 
Another possibility is for Russia to seek even closer relations with the EU. 
However, this option is not reaJly in the best interest of both parties. Besides the fragile 
economic situation of Russia, the EU will not help Russia with its security concerns. The 
185 Ibid, P 24 
186 Ibid, p26 
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EU still does not have its own peacekeeping or "military force" and would be ill­
equipped to address Russia's concerns. That would still require NATO's assistance. 
Furthermore, each European country has deait differently with Russia instead of the EU 
1· . h . R' 187spea <.ing wlt one vOlee to ussla. 
A further interesting possibility for Russia was raised by Sergei Karaganov, 
Chairman of the CounciJ on Foreign and Defense policy, who believes that a stronger G8 
could compensate for NATO. The G8 could take on new responsibilities, which could 
address global issues such as terrorism. 188 This could provide an interesting option for ail 
parties concerned. Russia is a full member of the G8 and would thus have equal weight 
on ail decisions and could also prove its effectiveness and build confidence among the 
other members. This could also lead to a potential entry in NATO. The big question, 
however, remains whether 08 members would accept such a role. 
One more viable option might be to simply cease NATO expansion. This solution 
would benefit both NATO/U.S and Russia. The ramifications for including Ukraine 
and/or Oeorgia in NATO will only aggravate CUITent tensions, as extending membership 
will not only outrage Russia and create potentially disastrous repercussions From their 
part. but may also become a serious liability for NATO members. NATO will be 
committed to protecting would-be members in the future. Although one can always argue 
that the United States might significantly benefit from the inevitable lucrative arms 
contracts in the short term, the U.S and NATO's manpower is presently locked down in 
1S7Grant Charles, "What to do about Russia?" Centre for European RefoTm Comment and Ana!ysis, October 
22"d 2006, available at http://www.cer.org.ukJanicles/grant_guardian220ct06.hlml 
18S Quoted in Straus, op.cil, p29. See also Ira Slraus, "A Stralegy for Russia's Next Sleps in the G-S: Russia 
Should Make Itselfa Leader in Building up the G-S, as a Way ofEnhancing Ils Role in the World," Online 
Magazine: Observer.com, June 27lh , 2002. 
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both Afghanistan and Iraq. FUlihermore, embracing Uh'aine's political instability and 
Georgia's internai military conflicts will only exhaust NATO's resources. 
Finally, another plausible solution was introduced in 2008 by Russian President 
Dmitri Medvedev who presented the idea of a new "European security architecture", to 
create a common, undivided security space in order to free participants of the legacy of 
the Cold Before applying these theories to our analysis, it would be useful to sum up the 
main similarities and differences between the approaches. First, both neorealism and 
constructivism see the state as the most important actor in the international system. Both 
view the international system as anarchic, and both agree that the international system 
will shape and hamper state interests. Looking at the ma1l1 differences, neorealism 
concentrates on state interests based on gains, rather than interests dependent on 
understanding relations among other states. Another difference is that neorealists 
concentrate on material factors. such as military and economlC power, rather than 
focusing on state interactions or an understanding what shapes and constructs the roles 
and interests of states. For constructivists, material factors depend on the intersubjective 
context. Thus, constructivists are more interested in the effects of norms and identities 
whereas neorealists focus on state calculations and security. 
War. The goal of this new treaty is to make Europe more secure by creating a 
legally binding document. The main purpose of this treaty wou Id be the construction of 
new mechanisms to deal with concerns and disputes (such as weapons control and related 
security issues). This mechanism wou Id require that ail international actions, whether 
effected by individual states or collective bodies, have some regard for the security 
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interests of ail other states. 189 In his draft, the Russian president alludes often to the 
importance of the Ul\J Charter and to how the proposed treaty might be informed by its 
principles. Medvedev believes it is important to consider the idea for he warned against 
"marginalizing and isolating countries, creating zones with differentiated levels of 
security, and abandoning the creation of general regional collective security systems.,,190 
Alluding to NATO, the president argues that NATO is unable to solve 21 sl Century 
problems (such as the crisis in Georgia) and that it is time to focus on new ideas and 
solutions. Yet the draft of the treaty is vague and confusing, and sorne actors argue that 
its main purpose is to decrease the role of the United States in the international arena. 
Commenting on the proposai, Hillary Clinton said "we believe that these common goals 
are best pursued in the context of existing institutions, such as the OSCE and the NATO-
Russia Council, rather than by negotiating new treaties, as Russia has suggested-a very 
long and cumbersome process.,,191 Despite her dismissal, and whether or not the proposed 
solution gains traction in the years to come, the idea has sufficient potential to develop 
and reshape the European security space. Whether it does or not, only time will tell. 
This lS only a very short list of plausible resolutions to the disagreements between 
Russia and the United States vis-à-vis NATO. There are severa] alternatives: working 
through these complex questions will offer to the readers various tracks for future 
exploration and research that is unfortunately impossible to do here. 
As stated above, it is important to consider the future consequences of a 
hypothetical NATO expansion. If a solution that would satisfy both parties is not found, 
189 See the full draft of the European Security Treaty November 29 2009 available at :
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then the plausibility of a new Cold War cannot be dismissed. Although the chances of 
such a regression are minimal, they cannot be discounted. An adversarial relationship 
between NATO members and Russia and its possibly its allies (Iran, China, and India) 
would affect not only Europe, but the Middle East and Asia. Thus, this potentially 
poisonous effect of NATO expansion would reshape global security schemes. 
Now that we have examined two different theoretical approaches, how can we, 
and should we, choose which approach is better suited to analyze Russia's behavior 
towards NATO? Should we even attempt to combine the two approaches? Neorealism is 
straight-forward: states are unitary rational actors that seek gains in a condition of 
international anarchy. Security is a states primai concern. The constructivist's advantage 
is that such analysis does not depend on arbitrary assumptions of state interest, nor does it 
ascribe categorical importance to material factors. The importance or such factors as 
military force emerges as a result of state's relationships and understandings. [t does not 
cause nor explain those relationships instead relationships ref1ect states' identities and 
interests. 
According to neorealists, Russia is only trying to safeguard its sphere of influence 
and curtail the growing power of the United States. As the United States is the greatest 
contributor to European security and the most powerful force in the organization, NATO 
cannot be used to counter or check its power; Russia must therefore reinforce its security 
by actively seeking strategic economic and military alliances with states dissatisfied with 
a unipolar world while simultaneously building its own influence. On the other hand, 
constructivism views Russia in a different way, seeing it nN as a competitive force 
against the United States, but as astate simply trying to secure and en large its place in the 
94 
international system. An alliance or cooperative arrangement with lndia and China should 
not be viewed in terms of aspirations to regain past glories, but simply as a means of 
ensuring that its voice is heard and taken seriously. 
Although both approaches share common tenets (such as the condition of 
international anarchy, and the capability of states to generate security threats, among 
other things), it is not necessary to try and combine both approaches, as does JelU1ifer 
Sterling-Folker. 192 The goal of this paper was to apply two different approaches and 
demonstrate how our case study cannat be adequately analyzed through one lens. There is 
no such thing as a perfect theory or approach: ail have their limitations, ambiguities and 
complexes. A useful perspective is to regard both neorealism and constructivism as 
offering distinctive insights, and the field of international relations is sufficiently complex 
that no single theory or approach is able to encompass it entirely. 
192 Sterling-Folker Jennifer, "Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or 
Rereading", Internalional SIl/dies Review, 4,1. Spring 2002, p 73-97 
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